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JUDICIAL SUPREMACY IN A FEDERALISM CONTEXT THROUGH 
THE LENS OF COOPER 
Joel K. Goldstein* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Cooper v. Aaron,1 the 1958 Supreme Court decision addressing the 
Little Rock school desegregation controversy, is a significant decision in 
American history. Justice Stephen Breyer has written, “The Little Rock 
cases eventually helped to produce victory for the cause of racial 
integration, a victory that helped secure the rule of law in America.”2 
Unfortunately, even sixty years after Cooper it remains premature to declare 
“victory” for racial integration as a description of American life. Contrary to 
the premise and promise of Brown v. Board of Education,3 America still 
operates in important ways as multiple, separate societies, not as an 
indivisible nation where all enjoy liberty and justice. Yet Justice Breyer 
surely is right that Cooper was an important milepost in the effort to make 
state-sponsored racial segregation unlawful. Cooper signaled that the Court 
would not accept mob violence as a reason to defer realization of 
constitutional rights for a minority group, thereby reaffirming its 
commitment to the rule of law. And Little Rock provided an occasion when 
Northerners could see, courtesy of newly-developed technologies, “the 
viciousness and brutality that was always latent in segregation,”4 thereby 
shifting public opinion in support of Brown. Cooper was an important step 
of America’s journey on a path which did not begin with Brown, but counts 
it as a giant leap. 
Notwithstanding its status as a landmark in America’s history 
regarding race, doctrinally Cooper is not primarily a case about civil rights. 
It is most significant for its discussion of, and claims regarding, the Supreme 
Court’s role in American government and federalism. Cooper famously 
 
* Vincent C. Immel Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. Thanks to Dean 
Theresa M. Beiner of the UA Little Rock William H. Bowen School of Law and the editors 
of the University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review for their invitation to participate in 
their symposium on Cooper v. Aaron and for their hospitality, and to the other participants 
for the stimulating discussion they provided. 
 1. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
 2. STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 49 (2010). 
 3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 4. David A. Strauss, Little Rock and the Legacy of Brown, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1065, 
1067 (2008). 
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asserted as a basic constitutional principle that the Supreme Court is the 
ultimate constitutional expositor.5 The Court relied on that precept in service 
of its insistence that its then-recent decision in Brown, which declared racial 
segregation in public schools unconstitutional,6 was the law of the land, that 
the decision was not simply the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution but 
what the Constitution meant and required, and that Brown constitutionally 
bound not only the parties before it,7 but also federal and state officials in 
non-party states like Arkansas as well.8 Whereas Brown was an opinion 
about the unconstitutionality of racial segregation, Cooper focused more on 
asserting judicial supremacy than on rejecting white supremacy.9 And it 
traced the principle it decreed regarding the finality of the Court’s 
constitutional decisions to Chief Justice John Marshall’s foundational 
opinion in Marbury v. Madison.10 
The Court was certainly on firm ground in demanding respect for 
Brown, but Cooper’s claims regarding judicial supremacy misstated their 
source, status, and strength. Marbury did not articulate the proposition of 
judicial supremacy as the Court claimed, but a narrower principle regarding 
the Court’s role as constitutional interpreter. Although the Court’s heavy 
reliance on Marbury was misplaced, its claims regarding judicial supremacy 
did find some support in other constitutional doctrine regarding the Court’s 
role, especially in a federalism context. Yet what allowed the Court to assert 
judicial supremacy was not so much the judicial doctrine consistent with its 
claim, but the support national political actors, particularly President Dwight 
D. Eisenhower and the Department of Justice, gave that principle in the 
months leading up to Cooper. Eisenhower and his lieutenants repeatedly 
defended the separate, but related, ideas that the Supreme Court’s 
constitutional interpretations bound other officials and that the executive 
branch was duty-bound to enforce federal court decisions. This support 
fortified the Court by persuading it that it would not stand alone against 
resisters. Even so, Eisenhower’s support was insufficient to enforce Brown. 
 
 5. 358 U.S. at 18 (“[T]he basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the 
exposition of the law of the Constitution. . . .”). 
 6. 347 U.S. 483. See generally Joel K. Goldstein, Approaches to Brown v. Board of 
Education: Some Notes on Teaching a Seminal Case, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 777 (2005). 
 7. Brown decided four cases involving “separate but equal” schools in the states of 
Kansas, Delaware, South Carolina, and Virginia. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 486. A companion 
case, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), addressed the constitutionality of the same 
doctrine in the District of Columbia under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 
 8. Cooper, 358 U.S. 1. 
 9. Cf. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. 
L. REV. 1, 22 (1959) (stating that the Court’s opinion in Cooper “deal[s], of course, with other 
matters”). 
 10. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
2019] FEDERALISM THROUGH THE LENS OF COOPER 163 
Unfortunately, that was a more complicated project, one not amenable to 
resolution simply by judicial pronouncement and decree. 
Especially in light of the Court’s reliance on Marbury, the comments 
and role of Eisenhower and his administration in the Little Rock crisis 
present something of an institutional and historical irony. The institutional 
irony was that the Court’s ability in Cooper to claim judicial supremacy as 
constitutional interpreter in a federalism context depended on public 
acceptance of that ideal by leaders of other branches of American 
government. Its claim was not self-executing, but rather required acceptance 
by political actors, and others. And the historic irony was that even though 
Cooper misattributed judicial supremacy to Marbury, the 1958 decision did 
underscore an important lesson from that classic case. In Marbury, Chief 
Justice John Marshall could not direct high executive officials to deliver a 
commission to William Marbury because he feared they would disobey the 
Court’s order.11 In Cooper, the Court could assert such a power because the 
executive branch had prospectively signaled its agreement. Nonetheless, 
even presidential support for the principle that the Court’s interpretations 
were binding law was insufficient to allow the Court’s pronouncements 
regarding school desegregation to be so treated. That project required 
societal acceptance as well. 
Appreciating the Court’s discussion of judicial supremacy requires 
some understanding of the facts that gave rise to the case. Accordingly, this 
article will begin with a rather lengthy sketch of the facts of Cooper and the 
context in which it arose. Part III will present the Court’s judicial supremacy 
assertion and demonstrate that the Court misstated Marbury and its lineage 
in American history. Part IV will consider other theories that might justify 
the Court’s claim of judicial supremacy in the federalism context Cooper 
presented. Part V will recount the important support Eisenhower and his 
administration gave judicial supremacy prior to the Court’s embrace of it 
and its impact. Part VI will offer conclusions. 
II. TO THE DECISION IN COOPER V. AARON 
On May 17, 1954, the Supreme Court, in Brown v. Board of 
Education,12 overturned the doctrine of “separate but equal” in public 
education13 on the grounds that government-sanctioned racial segregation 
 
 11. See infra text accompanying notes 155–56. 
 12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 13. Id. at 495 (“We conclude that in the field of public education, the doctrine of 
‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”). 
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stamped African-American children as inferiors.14 The Court, however, 
deferred imposing a remedy and invited further briefing on that subject 
during its next term.15 
Although Little Rock operated a segregated public school system, 
neither it nor Arkansas had been a defendant in Brown. The Little Rock 
School Board pledged to comply with Brown once the Supreme Court 
provided guidance16 despite the School Board’s disagreement with the 
decision.17 The Little Rock School Board directed school officials to prepare 
a plan.18 Among Southern cities, Little Rock had a reputation for relative 
racial moderation,19 and its initial attitude was consistent with the 
disposition of some other Southern centrists who felt compelled to abide by 
a Court decision notwithstanding their disagreement.20 Arkansas filed a brief 
in Brown II promising to implement Brown.21 Shortly before the Court gave 
its remedial guidance in Brown II, the Little Rock School Board made 
public its plan to allow a few black students to attend Central High School 
in 1957 with junior high school and elementary school integration beginning 
roughly three and six years later, respectively.22 The Little Rock plan 
allowed any student to attend a school where his or her race would be in the 
majority, thereby assuring whites that they would be able to transfer from a 
predominantly black school.23 The School Board’s initial response, modest 
though it was, later shifted to accommodate segregationist attitudes it 
encountered and School Board leaders privately reassured Little Rock’s 
white community that school desegregation would occur as slowly as 
possible.24 
 
 14. Id. at 494 (“To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely 
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that 
may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”). 
 15. Id. at 495–96. 
 16. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 7 (1958). 
 17. TONY A. FREYER, LITTLE ROCK ON TRIAL: COOPER V. AARON AND SCHOOL 
DESEGREGATION 16 (2007); see Cooper, 358 U.S. at 7; Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court 
and the Rule of Law: Cooper v. Aaron Revisited, 1982 U. ILL. L. Rev. 387, 391. 
 18. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 8. 
 19. Keith E. Whittington, The Court as the Final Arbiter of the Constitution: Cooper v. 
Aaron (1958), in CREATING CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: CLASHES OVER POWER AND LIBERTY 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 9, 10 (Greg Ivers & Kevin T. McGuire eds., 2004); Farber, supra note 
17, at 392; Strauss, supra note 4, at 1076; J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, Supreme Court and 
Southern School Desegregation, 1955–1970: A History and Analysis, 64 VA. L. REV. 485, 516 
(1978). 
 20. Farber, supra note 17, at 392. 
 21. FREYER, supra note 17, at 21–22. 
 22. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 7–8. 
 23. FREYER, supra note 17, at 27–28. 
 24. Id. at 23–24. 
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At the Supreme Court, some Justices worried about issuing 
unenforceable orders.25 As Corinna Barrett Lain has written, “Disobedience 
of Supreme Court rulings reveals the Court’s weakness; it shows that the 
emperor has no clothes and that the Supreme Court cannot, without help, 
make anyone do much of anything. That, in turn, renders the Court 
vulnerable to future disregard of its rulings.”26 These concerns of these 
Justices were not unfounded. Some Southern states had refused to submit 
briefs regarding implementation, suggesting a disposition to deny that the 
ultimate decision would bind them.27 At oral argument, the South’s lead 
attorney refused to commit to comply with a Supreme Court decision, 
stating “we would not send our white children to the Negro schools,”28 a 
position that seemed to undercut the fiction that the schools had been equal 
as well as separate as Plessy v. Ferguson29 required. 
At the recommendation of Attorney General Herbert Brownell, the 
Eisenhower administration accepted the Supreme Court’s invitation to 
participate in the briefing and argument of Brown.30 The Department of 
Justice urged the Court to require school districts to submit desegregation 
plans to the local supervising courts within ninety days,31 but the Court 
accepted those recommendations only in part.32 In its May, 1955 decision 
(Brown II),33 the Court imposed an obligation on local school districts, under 
the supervision of the local federal or state courts, to begin to desegregate 
schools “with all deliberate speed,”34 a formulation widely viewed as 
accepting a gradual desegregation.35 Some Justices had worried that 
requiring immediate desegregation would prompt defiance and hoped that a 
show of judicial patience would induce good faith compliance.36 
The hopes of the Justices were disappointed. Brown did not 
immediately achieve its current iconic status in American constitutional law. 
In fact, as David Strauss reminds us, some of its critics rejected it as “a 
 
 25. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED 
THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 246–47 (2009). 
 26. Corinna Barrett Lain, Soft Supremacy, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1609, 1658 (2017). 
 27. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND 
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 314 (2004). 
 28. FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at 246–47. 
 29. 163 U.S. 597 (1896). 
 30. HERBERT BROWNELL & JOHN BURKE, ADVISING IKE: THE MEMOIRS OF ATTORNEY 
GENERAL HERBERT BROWNELL 190–91 (1993). 
 31. BREYER, supra note 2, at 51 (summarizing Attorney General Herbert Brownell’s 
briefs); BROWNELL & BURKE, supra note 30, at 197. 
 32. BREYER, supra note 2, at 51; BROWNELL & BURKE, supra note 30, at 197. 
 33. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
 34. Id. 
 35. See, e.g., SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION 
141 (2010) (“[Brown II] seemed to put the brakes on rapid school desegregation.”). 
 36. FREYER, supra note 17, at 14. 
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lawless act of judicial usurpation.”37 Many Southern states reacted defiantly. 
About 100 Southern members of Congress signed a Southern Manifesto in 
March 1956 which decried the Court’s decisions in Brown I and II as “a 
clear abuse of judicial power” and insisted that the Plessy v. Ferguson38 
doctrine of “separate but equal,” which was nearly a century old, correctly 
construed the Equal Protection Clause.39 The signatories pledged “to use all 
lawful means to bring about a reversal of this decision which is contrary to 
the Constitution and to prevent the use of force in its implementation”;40 
although, as the distinguished legal historian Tony A. Freyer pointed out, 
the meaning of “lawful” was ambiguous.41 Arkansas’s two senators, John 
McClellan and J. William Fulbright, were among the nineteen senators who 
signed as did all six members of the House of Representatives from 
Arkansas, including the moderate Brook Hays.42 Arkansas Governor Orval 
E. Faubus had been elected as something of a racial moderate in 1954, yet 
over time embraced increasingly extreme segregationist positions apparently 
to advance his political career.43 
Frustrated by the gradual approach of the Little Rock School Board, the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), on 
behalf of thirty-three African-American children, filed suit against the Little 
Rock School District in federal court on February 8, 1956.44 The case drew 
its name from John Aaron, the first plaintiff, and Dr. William G. Cooper, the 
School Board President.45 In August 1956, the federal district court upheld 
the School Board’s minimalistic plan,46 and the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed that decision.47 
Whereas the NAACP sought to expedite integration, the Little Rock 
Citizens Council, consistent with the Southern pattern elsewhere, sought to 
 
 37. Strauss, supra note 4, at 1066; see also Charles J. Bloch, The School Segregation 
Cases: A Legal Error That Should Be Corrected, 45 A.B.A. J. 27, 98 (1959) (arguing that the 
Supreme Court lacked power in Brown to declare its decision as the “law of the land”); id. 
(denying that Brown could “irrevocably fix[]” government policy regarding non-party states); 
id. (denying that Brown was the law of the land). 
 38. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 39. 102 CONG. REC. 4459–61 (1956). 
 40. Id. at 4460. 
 41. FREYER, supra note 17, at 8; see also Recent Attacks upon the Supreme Court: A 
Statement by Members of the Bar, 42 A.B.A. 1128, 1128 (1956) (calling formulation 
appealing for “‘resistance’ to decisions of the Court ‘by any lawful means’” as a self-
contradiction and ambiguous). 
 42. 102 CONG. REC. 4460 (1956). 
 43. FREYER, supra note 17, at 8; Strauss, supra note 4, at 1077; Wilkinson, supra note 
19, at 515–17. 
 44. FREYER, supra note 17, at 34. 
 45. Id. at 34–35. 
 46. Aaron v. Cooper, 143 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. Ark. 1956). 
 47. Aaron v. Cooper, 243 F.2d. 361 (8th Cir. 1957). 
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prevent it.48 Amis Guthridge, working with gubernatorial candidate and 
arch-segregationist James Johnson, denied the legitimacy of Brown and 
adopted states’ rights rhetoric as code to perpetuate apartheid and to resist 
integration.49 The Council’s multi-faceted strategy included proposing 
legislation to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction over civil rights cases, 
intimidating blacks from voting, pushing Faubus to oppose integration, and 
threatening and using violence.50 Johnson unsuccessfully challenged Faubus 
in the Democratic primary in 1956, but the so-called Johnson interposition 
amendment to the Arkansas Constitution, which required adoption of 
measures to frustrate Brown, passed in the November election,51 and the 
electoral challenge also pushed Faubus towards segregationist policies.52 In 
particular, the referendum amended the state constitution directing the 
Arkansas State Legislature to resist “in every Constitutional manner the 
Unconstitutional desegregation decisions of May 17, 1954, and May 31, 
1955, of the United States Supreme Court[.]”53 The state legislature 
responded by passing laws relieving children from compulsory attendance at 
racially mixed schools, and establishing a State Sovereignty Commission.54 
Although President Dwight D. Eisenhower stated his unequivocal 
belief in his post-presidential memoir that Brown was correctly decided,55 he 
never publicly endorsed the decision as President.56 He later explained that 
he had refused to state publicly his view on that Supreme Court decision 
because he did not wish to set a precedent since he thought that if he ever 
expressed disagreement with an opinion that action would erode public 
confidence in his willingness to enforce it.57 Brownell regarded Eisenhower 
as a “strong supporter of states’ rights” who was disinclined to be a 
“crusader” for civil rights but who had “strong views” regarding the need to 
enforce law and his “deep respect” for the Constitution and the duties it 
 
 48. BREYER, supra note 2, at 52–54. 
 49. FREYER, supra note 17, at 36–38. 
 50. Id. at 39–40. 
 51. Id. at 69. 
 52. Id. at 64–67; Strauss, supra note 4, at 1077. 
 53. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1958). 
 54. Id. at 9. 
 55. DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, MANDATE FOR CHANGE: 1953–1956, at 229–30 (1963); 
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, WAGING PEACE, 1957–1961, at 150 (1965) [hereinafter WAGING 
PEACE]. 
 56. KLARMAN, supra note 27, at 324; cf. BROWNELL & BURKE, supra note 30, at 197–98 
(describing Eisenhower’s action in correcting the draft Republican platform in 1956 to point 
out that he had not taken a stand on Brown). 
 57. WAGING PEACE, supra note 55, at 150; see also The President’s News Conference of 
September 5, 1956, 1956 PUB. PAPERS 732, 737 (Sept. 5, 1956) (“I think it makes no 
difference whether or not I endorse [Brown]. The Constitution is as the Supreme Court 
interprets it; and I must conform to that and do my very best to see that it is carried out in this 
country.”). 
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imposed on the President.58 Others construed Eisenhower’s behavior as 
signaling a “general dislike” for the decision.59 Eisenhower had made 
inroads into the South and Border States in 1952 and hoped to expand his 
support in those regions in 1956. 
After the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
affirmed the Little Rock gradualist program, the Little Rock schools 
proceeded to prepare for a few black students to begin attending Central 
High School in September 1957.60 In response to opposition from leaders of 
the Citizens Council, the Little Rock School Board reaffirmed its 
disagreement with Brown but deemed itself committed to follow it based on 
the Supremacy Clause and the federal court decisions.61 Faubus, too, had 
initially conceded publicly that federal laws prevailed over state laws.62 As 
the school year approached, however, the Central High Mothers’ League 
mobilized to oppose the inclusion of nine African-American students at 
Central High.63 One of its leaders proclaimed that the loss of state autonomy 
Brown involved would cost “everything that has made America a great and 
Christian nation.”64 Faubus spent time with segregationists who suggested 
that integration would adversely affect his re-election prospects in 1958.65 
Faubus connived to have Mothers’ League personnel file a state court 
lawsuit seeking to enjoin the desegregation plan to avert threatened 
violence.66 Although Faubus testified to the likelihood of violence, various 
Little Rock School Board and police officials contested his prediction.67 
Nonetheless, the state judge, who Faubus had appointed, granted the 
injunction on August 29, 1957.68 The Little Rock School Board then asked 
 
 58. BROWNELL & BURKE, supra note 30, at 190. 
 59. See, e.g., FREYER, supra note 17, at 11; see also RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 
753 (1975) (criticizing President Eisenhower for not publicly supporting Brown); ROBERT G. 
MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 217 (1960) (stating that Eisenhower’s “moral 
support” for Brown “which might have helped to muster obedience, was accorded too 
grudgingly and tardily to do much good”); Frederic M. Bloom, Cooper’s Quiet Demise:(A 
Short Response to Professor Strauss), 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1115, 1119 (2008) (calling 
Eisenhower “at best an ambivalent supporter of Brown”); cf. Farber, supra note 17, at 394 & 
n.65 (stating that Eisenhower’s views on Brown were “unclear” and that there was “some 
evidence” he opposed it). But see LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
AMERICAN ELITE, 1789–2008, at 246 (2009) (rejecting the idea that Eisenhower opposed 
Brown). 
 60. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1958). 
 61. FREYER, supra note 17, at 80–81. 
 62. Id. at 95. 
 63. Id. at 95–97. 
 64. Id. at 97. 
 65. Id. at 95–96. 
 66. Id. at 105. 
 67. FREYER, supra note 17, at 105. 
 68. Id. at 104–06; see BREYER, supra note 2, at 55. 
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the federal court to quash the state-court issued injunction which it did the 
following day.69 The School Board later blamed Faubus for intensifying 
opposition to its desegregation plan and encouraging the hope that Arkansas 
had constitutional power to defy Brown.70 
A few days later, Faubus dispatched the Arkansas National Guard to 
Central High School without any request from school officials.71 In a 
televised speech on September 2, 1957, Faubus said that recent events had 
left most Arkansas citizens doubtful that Brown bound the state.72 Moreover, 
he stated that he was bound by the November 1956 interposition measures 
and subsequent acts the state legislature had adopted.73 Uncertainty 
regarding whether Brown or the Arkansas laws were supreme had 
contributed to a climate of imminent disorder.74 The troops would not act as 
“segregationists or integrationists” but that since “forcible integration” 
would interfere with law and order the public schools would operate “for the 
time being” as they had traditionally,75 in other words, on a segregationist 
basis. The Little Rock School Board then publicly asked the nine African-
American students not to attend Central High School until the legal dispute 
was resolved.76 None sought to attend on September 3, 1957.77 The district 
court held a hearing that day in response to the School Board’s request for 
instructions, and determined that the state’s positioning of troops at Central 
High was not a reason to depart from the approved plan to desegregate the 
school.78 
On September 4, 1957, the nine African-American students sought to 
enter Central High, but the Arkansas National Guard and a hostile mob 
prevented them from going to school.79 One student, Elizabeth Eckford, 
 
 69. Whittington, supra note 19, at 12. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
upheld the decision. Thomason v. Cooper, 254 F.2d. 808, 811 (8th Cir. 1958). 
 70. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 10 (1958) (“The Board’s petition for postponement in 
this proceeding states: ‘The effect of that action [of the Governor] was to harden the core of 
opposition to the Plan and cause many persons who theretofore had reluctantly accepted the 
Plan to believe there was some power in the State of Arkansas which, when exerted, could 
nullify the Federal law and permit disobedience of the decree of this [District] Court, and, 
from that date, hostility to the Plan was increased, and criticism of the officials of the 
[School] District has become more bitter and unrestrained.’”). 
 71. Id. at 9. 
 72. FREYER, supra note 17, at 113. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Whittington, supra note 19, at 12–13. 
 76. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 10 (1958); Whittington, supra note 19, at 13. 
 77. Whittington, supra note 19, at 13. 
 78. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 10–11. 
 79. Id. at 11 (“On the morning of the next day, September 4, 1957, the Negro children 
attempted to enter the high school, but, as the District Court later found, units of the Arkansas 
National Guard, ‘acting pursuant to the Governor’s order, stood shoulder to shoulder at the 
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became separated from the others and was taunted with vicious racial 
epithets by angry whites; a photograph capturing the ugly scene was 
transmitted internationally.80 
The federal district court then asked the federal government to 
intervene in the case and to investigate whether Faubus had interfered with 
the district court’s order.81 The Little Rock School Board requested a delay 
of desegregation, which the federal court denied on September 7, 1957.82 
In acknowledging receipt of Faubus’s telegram regarding the crisis, 
Eisenhower responded on September 5, 1957, “When I became President, I 
took an oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States. 
The only assurance I can give you is that the Federal Constitution will be 
upheld by me by every legal means at my command.”83 Eisenhower denied 
that the federal government was considering arresting Faubus or had tapped 
his phone and expressed confidence that Faubus and other Arkansas 
officials, including the National Guard would “give full cooperation to the 
United States District Court.”84 
Faubus requested a meeting with Eisenhower,85 and, with 
Representative Brooks Hays of Arkansas serving as an intermediary, 
Eisenhower and Faubus met during the President’s vacation in Newport, 
Rhode Island.86 Eisenhower sought to persuade Faubus that he could not 
prevail in a contest with the national government and asked him to have the 
National Guard protect the African-American students, not prevent them 
from attending school.87 Faubus expressed recognition that federal law 
prevailed over contrary state law and left Eisenhower with the impression 
that he would accede to his requests,88 but he was less agreeable before 
cameras. Eisenhower reported that Faubus had said he would honor federal 
 
school grounds and thereby forcibly prevented the 9 Negro students . . . from entering,’ as 
they continued to do every school day during the following three weeks.”). 
 80. BREYER, supra note 2, at 56; FREYER, supra note 17, at 115. 
 81. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 11. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Telegram to the Governor of Arkansas in Response to His Request for Assurance 
Regarding His Action at Little Rock, 1957 PUB. PAPERS 659, 659 (Sept. 5, 1957) [hereinafter 
Telegram on Assurance to the Governor]. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Telegram to the Governor of Arkansas in Response to His Request for a Meeting, 
1957 PUB. PAPERS 673 (Sept. 11, 1957). 
 86. WAGING PEACE, supra note 55, at 166. 
 87. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Diary, EISENHOWER ARCHIVES (Oct. 8, 1957), https://www. 
eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/civil_rights_little_rock/1957_10_08_Di
ary_Notes_Faubus_Meeting.pdf. 
 88. Id. 
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court orders89 and expressed confidence that Faubus would comply with the 
supreme law of the land.90 
Eisenhower’s confidence was misplaced. At a federal court argument 
on September 20, 1957, Faubus’s representatives opposed the federal 
government’s request for an injunction and questioned the court’s 
jurisdiction.91 When the court rejected Faubus’s jurisdictional arguments, the 
State’s attorneys left the hearing.92 The federal court issued an injunction 
against Faubus and officers of the Arkansas National Guard and directed 
them to enforce, not seek to nullify, the court’s order.93 Faubus then 
withdrew the Arkansas National Guard.94 Eisenhower issued a statement 
acknowledging that local law enforcement authorities were prepared to 
maintain law and order as the School Board proceeded with its 
desegregation plan,95 called for a “sympathetic understanding of the ordeal” 
of the African-American students and praised the “dignity and . . . restraint” 
they and their parents had demonstrated,96 and expressed confidence that 
citizens of Little Rock and Arkansas “will welcome this opportunity to 
demonstrate that in their city and in their state proper orders of a United 
States Court will be executed promptly and without disorder.”97 
Once again, Eisenhower proved overly optimistic in his expectations or 
exhortations, whichever they were. Although the nine African-American 
students finally entered Central High on September 23, 1957 under the 
protection of the Little Rock Police Department and other law enforcement 
despite the presence of a large, hostile mob, officials thought the situation 
precarious and sent them home early.98 Eisenhower issued an angry 
statement about the “disgraceful occurrences” at Central High School and in 
Little Rock, in which he asserted that federal law and court orders could not 
be “flouted with impunity by any individual or any mob of extremists,” 
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pledged to use necessary force “to prevent any obstruction of the law and to 
carry out” federal court orders,” and implored “every right thinking citizen” 
to hope that “the American sense of justice and fair play will prevail in this 
case” since “[i]t will be a sad day for this country—both at home and 
abroad—if school children can safely attend their classes only under the 
protection of armed guards.”99 Eisenhower expressed “confidence” that 
“citizens of Little Rock and of Arkansas will respect the law and will not 
countenance violations of law and order by extremists.”100 He also issued a 
presidential proclamation finding that “certain persons in the State of 
Arkansas, individually and in unlawful assemblages, combinations, and 
conspiracies ha[d] willfully obstructed the enforcement of [federal court] 
orders” and that “such obstruction of justice constitutes a denial of the equal 
protection of the laws secured by the Constitution of the United States” and 
accordingly commanded all such persons to cease and desist from such 
behavior and to disperse.101 
At this point, President Eisenhower reinforced his words with dramatic 
action. He nationalized the Arkansas National Guard and directed the 
Secretary of Defense to dispatch federal troops to Little Rock to enforce the 
federal court orders regarding the desegregation of Central High School.102 
On September 24, 1957, aircraft carrying roughly one thousand troops of the 
101
st
 Airborne Division of the United States Army arrived in Little Rock.103 
Eisenhower returned to the White House to address the nation by 
television and radio on the Little Rock crisis. In his speech, Eisenhower 
repeatedly explained that his obligation as President to enforce federal court 
orders compelled his decision to send federal troops to Little Rock.104 Since 
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“under the leadership of demagogic extremists, disorderly mobs have 
deliberately prevented the carrying out of proper orders from a Federal 
Court” and local authorities had not “eliminated that violent opposition,” the 
President’s “responsibility” had become “inescapable.”105 Although some 
Southern cities had proceeded in accordance with Brown, thereby 
demonstrating to the world that America was a nation subject to law,106 
agitators in Little Rock had defied law. Presidential action was necessary to 
protect individual liberty and security. “The very basis of our individual 
rights and freedoms rests upon the certainty that the President and the 
Executive Branch of Government will support and insure the carrying out of 
the decisions of the Federal Courts, even, when necessary with all the means 
at the President’s command[,]” Eisenhower said.107 Eisenhower reminded 
the country that the Supreme Court had held that “separate public 
educational facilities for the races are inherently unequal and therefore 
compulsory school segregation laws are unconstitutional.”108 That decision 
settled the constitutional question, Eisenhower suggested.109 “Our personal 
opinions about the decision have no bearing on the matter of enforcement; 
the responsibility and authority of the Supreme Court to interpret the 
Constitution are very clear.”110 The following day, the federal troops 
escorted the nine African-American students into Central High School.111 
The experience of the nine students during the next months was “not a 
happy one.”112 White students subjected their African-American classmates 
to violence and harassment and the school had to deal with bomb threats and 
other acts of vandalism and terror, threatened or actual.113 In early 1958, the 
Little Rock School Board asked the federal district court to delay integration 
by thirty months.114 It attributed the request to the difficulty of operating the 
schools given the hostility of the governor, state legislature, and community 
and to allow courts to consider the legality of state measures challenging 
Brown.115 The district court granted the School Board’s request in June 
1958,116 but the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed two months 
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later in mid-August 1958.117 The Supreme Court agreed to hear an appeal in 
the case.118 That in itself was significant since the Court had refused to 
accept other school desegregation cases after Brown. In fact, other than 
Brown, Cooper was the only such case the Court heard until 1963.119 
In different ways, the briefs before the Supreme Court raised the issue 
regarding the binding effect of Brown. The Little Rock School Board argued 
that it had attempted in good faith to comply with Brown I and II but had 
been precluded from doing so due to widespread public opposition and 
violence and resistance by officials of all branches of Arkansas’s 
government.120 Indeed, the Arkansas legislature had recently passed bills 
awaiting Faubus’s action to allow the governor to close schools to avoid 
integration, to allow students to transfer to segregated schools or to attend 
segregated classes, and to recall School Board members who complied with 
Brown.121 The situation confronting the Little Rock School Board involved 
“massive resistance to and defiance of a constitutional principle running 
counter to the mores of the people.”122 Popular public officials had 
encouraged Arkansas citizens to pursue “a steady course of absolute 
nonrecognition of the validity of the Brown decisions, usually on the 
premise that they are unconstitutional.”123 Since “thousands of school 
districts” in the South had done nothing to comply with Brown, “it would be 
the height of irony” if Little Rock’s schools, “having made the start in good 
faith,” were denied a delay “at the expense of the entire educational program 
at the high school level.”124 
In their simultaneous submission, the respondent characterized the 
question before the Court as “a national test of the vitality of the principle 
enunciated in Brown”125 and as involving “not only vindication of the 
constitutional rights declared in Brown, but indeed the very survival of the 
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Rule of Law” including “the supremacy of all constitutional rights over 
bigots—big and small.”126 
During oral argument, the question of the status of Brown became more 
prominent. The counsel for the Little Rock School Board repeatedly 
suggested that actions by state officials had created uncertainty regarding 
whether Brown was constitutional and that these doubts had encouraged 
public resistance,127 which might be resolved by state court decisions finding 
various Arkansas interposition measures unconstitutional.128 The School 
Board’s attorney said that the case went beyond problems raised by “lawless 
mobs” to “the conflict of two sovereignties: the State and Federal 
Governments”129 and raised the “essential issue[]” of the “refusal of a State 
government to accept the validity of a Federal court decision as being the 
law.”130 
As attorney for the children, Thurgood Marshall responded that it was 
“one thing” for a state politician to express disagreement with a Court 
decision but “it’s another thing for a lawyer to stand up in this Court and 
argue that there is any doubt about it” which is “where we are in this 
case.”131 Marshall argued that he could not imagine “any more horrible 
destruction of principle of citizenship” than to signal white children that 
they could “violate the law and defy the lawful authorities” yet prevail.132 In 
closing, Marshall said Cooper involved the “narrow question” of whether a 
federal district court could delay a desegregation plan in progress “solely 
because of violence and threats of violence.”133 In calling for a negative 
answer, he asked that the Court deliver that response “in such a fashion as to 
make it clear even to the politicians in Arkansas that Article VI of the 
Constitution means what it says.”134 
Similarly, J. Lee Rankin, the United States Solicitor General, argued 
that the Supremacy Clause made Brown the supreme law of the land135 and 
the Oath Clause made it binding on federal and state officials.136 The Little 
Rock School Board should “carry out the obligations of the Constitution of 
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the United States as interpreted by this Court.”137 Rankin said that the Little 
Rock schools should educate “the people that this Supreme Court has 
spoken, that’s the law of the land; it’s binding; we’ve got to do it,” and that 
their duty as citizens was “to obey the law and to support the 
Constitution.”138 
In its opinion, the Supreme Court accepted the lower court’s findings 
that the School Board, the School Superintendent, and counsel had acted in 
good faith and that the events in Little Rock had impeded the educational 
progress of all students.139 The Court considered these findings: 
[I]n light of the fact, indisputably revealed by the record . . . that the 
conditions they depict are directly traceable to the actions of legislators 
and executive officials of the State of Arkansas, taken in their official 
capacities, which reflect their own determination to resist this Court’s 
decision in the Brown case and which have brought about violent 
resistance to that decision in Arkansas.
140
 
Whereas Cooper came to the Court as a case about the integration of 
the Little Rock public schools pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause, the 
Court characterized it differently. Brown had already held that state-
mandated segregation in public education was unconstitutional.141 The issue 
in Cooper was Brown’s status. Thus, the Court framed Cooper as raising 
fundamental issues of federalism and separation of powers, not primarily as 
a case about desegregation. The opinion, signed by all nine Justices as co-
authors, began: 
As this case reaches us, it raises questions of the highest importance to 
the maintenance of our federal system of government. It necessarily 
involves a claim by the Governor and Legislature of a State that there is 
no duty on state officials to obey federal court orders resting on this 
Court’s considered interpretation of the United States Constitution. 
Specifically, it involves actions by the Governor and Legislature of 
Arkansas upon the premise that they are not bound by our holding 
in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483. That holding was that 
the Fourteenth Amendment forbids States to use their governmental 
powers to bar children on racial grounds from attending schools where 
there is state participation through any arrangement, management, funds 
or property. We are urged to uphold a suspension of the Little Rock 
School Board’s plan to do away with segregated public schools in Little 
Rock until state laws and efforts to upset and nullify our holding 
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in Brown v. Board of Education have been further challenged and tested 
in the courts. We reject these contentions.
142
 
The Court spent most of its twenty-page opinion summarizing the 
procedural history and facts of the case including the lower court’s findings 
that actions of state executive and legislative officials had created conditions 
that led the Little Rock School Board to seek to delay desegregation.143 The 
Court pointed out that the actions of state executive and legislative officials 
constituted state action in violation of the Equal Protection Clause from 
which the Little Rock School Board could not disassociate itself 
notwithstanding its good faith.144 The Court wrote: 
[T]he constitutional rights of children not to be discriminated against in 
school admission on grounds of race or color declared by this Court in 
the Brown case can neither be nullified openly and directly by state 
legislators or state executive or judicial officers nor nullified indirectly 
by them through evasive schemes for segregation whether attempted 
“ingeniously or ingenuously.”145 
“What has been said, in the light of the facts developed, is enough to 
dispose of the case,” the Court declared as it neared the end of page 
seventeen of its twenty-page opinion.146 Yet the Court did not want to stop 
without “answer[ing] the premise of the actions of the Governor and 
Legislature that they are not bound by our holding in the Brown case,” an 
answer it said required “only to recall some basic constitutional propositions 
which are settled doctrine.”147 
III. THE JUDICIAL SUPREMACY ARGUMENT 
A. The Argument in Cooper 
In the closing passages of its opinion in Cooper, the Supreme Court 
asserted that the Constitution made the Supreme Court the ultimate 
expositor of the Constitution. In the familiar language the nine Justices as 
co-authors, wrote in pertinent part: 
Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution the “supreme Law 
of the Land.” In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for a unanimous 
Court, referring to the Constitution as “the fundamental and paramount 
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law of the nation,” declared in the notable case of Marbury v. Madison, 1 
Cranch 137, 5 U. S. 177, that “It is emphatically the province and duty of 
the judicial department to say what the law is.” This decision declared 
the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition 
of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been 
respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and 
indispensable feature of our constitutional system. It follows that the 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in 
the Brown case is the supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the 
Constitution makes it of binding effect on the States “any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” 
Every state legislator and executive and judicial officer is solemnly 
committed by oath taken pursuant to Art. VI, cl. 3 “to support this 
Constitution.”148 
The first sentence accurately summarized part of the Supremacy 
Clause, and the second sentence correctly quoted Marbury. Those two 
sentences provided foundation for the third sentence which proclaimed, and 
attributed to Marbury, the doctrine of judicial supremacy in constitutional 
interpretation (“This decision declared the basic principle that the federal 
judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that 
principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a 
permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system.”). The 
fourth sentence asserted that the Court’s interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in Brown was the supreme law of the land notwithstanding 
anything in state law. 
The Justices surely thought that invoking Marbury strengthened their 
contention that the Court’s opinion in Brown bound Governor Faubus, the 
Arkansas State Legislature, and other Arkansas officials rather than leaving 
them free to follow their own constitutional interpretations. But Marbury did 
not really say what Cooper said it did, and the principle of judicial 
supremacy was not nearly as well-established as the Court claimed. 
B. The Mistaken Reliance on Marbury 
The particulars of Marbury are familiar,149 perhaps painfully so, to law 
students everywhere. Following the Federalists’ defeat in the 1800 
presidential election, the lame-duck Federalist Congress had created 
additional federal judgeships which outgoing President John Adams could 
fill with co-partisans before Thomas Jefferson and his loyalists took control 
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of the national legislative and executive branches.150 In abbreviated form, 
William Marbury was among those Adams nominated and the Senate 
confirmed as a Justice of the Peace for the District of Columbia in the 
closing hours of the Adams presidency, but although Adams signed 
Marbury’s commission and Secretary of State John Marshall affixed the seal 
of the United States to it, thereby authenticating Adams’s John Hancock, 
Marbury and a few others did not receive their commissions before Adams’s 
term ended.151 Jefferson directed his new Secretary of State, James Madison, 
not to deliver some commissions, including Marbury’s.152 Meanwhile, 
during the last weeks of Adams’s term, the ubiquitous Marshall was 
installed as Chief Justice, having been nominated by Adams and confirmed 
by the Senate.153 Marbury sought a writ of mandamus from the Supreme 
Court under section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 to direct Madison to 
deliver his commission.154 
Marshall and his judicial colleagues were in a bind. They feared that 
Jefferson would defy a Court order directing Madison to deliver the 
commissions, recognized that the Court would be powerless to compel 
compliance, and worried that such a scenario would reveal the Court’s 
frailty, undermine its future utility, and perhaps prompt repercussions 
against some of its members.155 Those consequences might be avoided by 
concluding that the Court could never assert jurisdiction over a high 
executive officer, a course that would mollify Jefferson but would create 
doctrine crippling the Court.156 
Instead, Marshall devised a judicial strategy that allowed him to score 
doctrinal and political points while avoiding an unwinnable confrontation 
with Jefferson and Madison.157 Marshall concluded that Marbury was 
entitled to the commission that Jefferson and Madison wrongfully 
withheld158 and that federal courts could assert jurisdiction over high 
executive officials like Madison in cases where an individual claimed that 
the federal official had violated a legal duty to him or her.159 These 
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conclusions were mere dicta, however, because the Court determined that in 
this instance it could not issue such an order because section 13, as Marshall 
interpreted it, attempted to give the Court original subject matter jurisdiction 
over a case in which the Constitution gave the Supreme Court only appellate 
subject matter jurisdiction.160 
Much could and has been said about Marshall’s reasoning, but this 
article is not the place for an extended discussion. Marbury, of course, 
established several important constitutional principles: the Constitution is 
paramount law; our system is one in which government and governing 
institutions have limited powers conferred and confined by law; officials are 
accountable to law and to democratic judgments; and the judiciary has the 
power of judicial review, i.e., to interpret law which arises in a case or 
controversy before it and to determine whether a statute is consistent with 
the Constitution and, if it is not, to refuse to apply it.161 
But Marbury did not say that the Court was the ultimate constitutional 
interpreter.162 The statements it made (“It is emphatically the province and 
duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is.”163), and on which 
Cooper relied in part, alone and especially when read in context, fell short of 
declaring “the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the 
exposition of the law of the Constitution.”164 Rather than make that claim, 
Marshall made the more modest assertion that the Court could interpret the 
Constitution to decide a case, and in doing so, could declare a law 
unconstitutional and accordingly refuse to give it effect.165 
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Most of Marshall’s discussion establishes that the judiciary has the 
power and duty to review legislation as it becomes pertinent in cases or 
controversies to determine whether or not it is constitutional, not that the 
Court’s interpretation binds subsequent non-party conduct. That becomes 
clearer when the sentences following the one the Court cited are added since 
they speak only to the Court’s power of judicial review without claiming a 
monopoly or ultimate interpretive power.166 And elsewhere in Marbury, 
Marshall suggested that the Court’s power to interpret the Constitution in 
the course of its work is not exclusive. He reasoned that courts can interpret 
the Constitution since they are governed by it.167 Courts must interpret it to 
make certain they remain within its confines.168 He wrote that “it is apparent 
that the framers of the Constitution contemplated [the Constitution] as a rule 
for the government of courts, as well as of the Legislature.”169 If the fact that 
the Constitution bound the courts required them to interpret the Constitution, 
it also empowered Congress to interpret the Constitution to make sure it also 
stayed within its boundaries.170 Marshall returned to that theme in expanded 
form in closing Marbury: “Thus, the particular phraseology of the 
Constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, 
supposed to be essential to all written Constitutions, that a law repugnant to 
the Constitution is void, and that courts, as well as other departments, are 
bound by that instrument.”171 
Marshall also rested the judiciary’s power to interpret the 
Constitution172 on the Oath Clause173 which compels federal judges to swear 
to support the Constitution. How could they fulfill that commitment without 
interpreting it? Yet the same logic would also apply to other national and 
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the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support 
this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office 
or public Trust under the United States.”). 
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state officials who also commit to support the Constitution.174 Accordingly, 
the Oath Clause tends to rebut the idea that courts have a unique relationship 
with the Constitution. 
Marbury simply established that the Court had power to interpret the 
Constitution in the course of deciding cases and controversies.175 It made no 
claim regarding the scope of its power.176 Indeed, a narrow reading of the 
case consistent with its facts would limit that power to questions regarding 
the Court’s jurisdiction,177 although Marbury hinted, and later decisions 
confirmed,178 that the power of judicial review extended further. Marbury 
implied that its power to interpret the Constitution was not exclusive.179 And 
it made no claim that other branches were bound in later actions by the 
Court’s constitutional interpretations. 
In fact, such a claim of interpretive superiority would have been 
inconsistent with Marshall’s agenda in Marbury. Marshall was trying to 
establish foundational principles of American constitutional law including 
the power of judicial review, but he was also anxious to avoid a conflict 
 
 174. Id.; see 4 MALONE, supra note 149, at 151 (arguing that Marshall’s reliance on oaths 
left room for executive and legislative interpretation). 
 175. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177–78 (“It is emphatically the province and duty of 
the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases 
must, of necessity, expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the 
Courts must decide on the operation of each. So, if a law be in opposition to the Constitution, 
if both the law and the Constitution apply to a particular case, so that the Court must either 
decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the Constitution, or conformably to the 
Constitution, disregarding the law, the Court must determine which of these conflicting rules 
governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.”). 
 176. See Van Alstyne, supra note 149, at 36–37. 
 177. See, e.g., POWELL, supra note 170, at 8 (describing this possible interpretation); Van 
Alstyne, supra note 149, at 34–36 (describing though rejecting this narrow interpretation of 
Marbury). 
 178. See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 377 (1821) (“If such be the 
constitution, it is the duty of the Court to bow with respectful submission to its provisions. If 
such be not the constitution, it is equally the duty of this Court to say so; and to perform that 
task which the American people have assigned to the judicial department.”); McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 400–01 (1819) (“In the case now to be determined, the 
defendant, a sovereign state, denies the obligation of a law enacted by the legislature of the 
Union, and the plaintiff, on his part, contests the validity of an act which has been passed by 
the legislature of that State. . . . On the supreme court of the United States has the 
Constitution of our country devolved this important duty.”); id. at 423 (“Should congress, in 
the execution of its powers, adopt measures which are prohibited by the constitution, or 
should congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment 
of objects not intrusted to the government, it would become the painful duty of this tribunal, 
should a case requiring such a decision come before it, to say that such an act was not the law 
of the land.”). 
 179. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 179–80 (describing the Constitution as binding the 
legislature and other departments as well as the courts). 
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with Jefferson and Madison. Asserting judicial superiority would have 
invited unwanted retaliation. 
Moreover, Marshall’s opinion in Marbury deliberately avoided reliance 
on executive enforcement which would have tested a claim of judicial 
supremacy. The holding, that section 13 was unconstitutional because 
Congress could not expand the Court’s original jurisdiction, did not require 
the Court to assert that it was the supreme constitutional interpreter. No 
other branch needed to comply with the Court’s decision. The Court simply 
recognized a limit on its own power by concluding it could not decide 
Marbury’s case; it did not require Congress, the President, or anyone else to 
acknowledge its interpretive supremacy. 
Significantly, Marshall made more modest claims for the judiciary in 
Marbury than Alexander Hamilton had made in The Federalist Papers 
fifteen years earlier.180 Hamilton had argued that “[t]he interpretation of the 
laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts.”181 Hamilton’s 
formulation, particularly in its use of “peculiar,” suggested that the 
judiciary’s role in interpreting laws, including the Constitution, was unique. 
Hamilton also wrote that the judiciary’s duty was “to declare all acts 
contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void.”182 Hamilton further 
buttressed that conclusion by calling the judiciary “the least dangerous” 
branch since it possessed neither the purse nor the sword.183 Accordingly, 
Hamilton reasoned that the judiciary could safely determine the 
Constitution’s bounds because it was least able to aggrandize power in a 
manner inconsistent with those limits.184 Hamilton accordingly used the 
Court’s relative weakness to justify the Court’s role as constitutional 
umpire. 
By contrast, Marshall did not invoke “the least dangerous branch” 
rationale in Marbury. Yes, he wanted to avoid a hopeless confrontation with 
Jefferson but without being obsequious. But he also did not need to make 
such a sweeping claim regarding judicial supremacy in order to refuse to 
exercise original subject matter jurisdiction in Marbury’s case. All he 
needed to establish was that the Court had the more limited power of 
judicial review. 
 
 180. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 464–72 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961). 
 181. Id. at 467. 
 182. Id. at 466. 
 183. Id. at 465. 
 184. Id. at 465–66. 
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C. A Brief Sketch of Judicial Supremacy in History and Doctrine 
Notwithstanding the Court’s claim in Cooper, judicial supremacy has 
not rested on the sturdy foundation it depicted.185 Not only did Marbury not 
support the judicial supremacy proposition the Court asserted in Cooper, 
historically Marbury was not read as establishing judicial supremacy in 
constitutional interpretation. Before and after Marbury, prominent thinkers 
rejected the idea that the judiciary’s constitutional interpretations bound 
other non-party actors. In the first years after adoption of the Constitution, 
the three branches were widely thought to enjoy interpretive 
independence.186 Although courts upheld the constitutionality of the Alien 
and Sedition Acts, Thomas Jefferson wrote that the President, deeming 
those laws unconstitutional, could use his pardon power to negate those 
sentences.187 In his First Inaugural Address, President Abraham Lincoln 
conceded that the Supreme Court’s constitutional interpretations bound the 
parties to the particular case and merited influence in related matters but 
denied that they necessarily bound non-parties.188 Politicians, Richard A. 
Fallon, Jr. has pointed out, routinely claim that various judicial decisions 
improperly interpret the Constitution and work to change them.189 This 
behavior is not unique to this age but characterized earlier times regarding 
 
 185. Paul A. Freund, Storm over the American Supreme Court, 21 MOD. L. REV. 345, 346 
(1958) (“Resistance to the court has been a persistent strain in American life from the 
beginning. . . .”). 
 186. KRAMER, supra note 149, at 105–10, 135–36. 
 187. Thomas Jefferson, Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Mrs. John Adams (Sept. 11, 
1804), in 11 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 49, 50–51 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1905); 
see also 4 MALONE, supra note 149, at 153–56 (discussing Jefferson’s belief that branches of 
federal government shared duty to interpret Constitution); id. at 207 (discussing Jefferson’s 
pardons and view that the Sedition Act was unconstitutional). 
 188. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in 4 THE COLLECTED 
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 262, 268 (Roy P. Brasler ed., 1953) (“I do not forget the 
position assumed by some, that constitutional questions are to be decided by the Supreme 
Court; nor do I deny that such decisions must be binding in any case, upon the parties to a 
suit as to the object of that suit, while they are also entitled to very high respect and 
consideration, in all parallel cases, by all other departments of the government. And while it 
is obviously possible that such decision may be erroneous in any given case, still the evil 
effect following it, being limited to that particular case, with the chance that it may be 
overruled and never become a precedent for other cases, can better be borne than could the 
evils of a different practice. At the same time the candid citizen must confess that if the 
policy of the government, upon vital questions, affecting the whole people, is to be 
irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made in ordinary 
litigation between parties, in personal actions, the people will have ceased, to be their own 
rulers, having, to that extent, practically resigned their government, into the hands of that 
eminent tribunal.”). 
 189. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicial Supremacy, Departmentalism, and the Rule of Law 
in a Populist Age, 96 TEX. L. REV. 487, 498–500 (2018). 
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decisions like Dred Scott v. Sandford,190 Plessy v. Ferguson,191 Lochner v. 
New York,192 and other judicial mistakes.193 
As suggested above, political actors have discharged their duties based 
on constitutional interpretations different from those of the courts. 
Presidents might veto measures based on constitutional considerations that 
take issue with judicial decisions or pardon convicted defendants based on 
the view that they were indicted for violating unconstitutional laws as 
Jefferson did. Legislators might debate or vote on measures based on 
constitutional conclusions that diverge from those the Court has given. 
Congress has passed, and Presidents have recognized, legislative veto 
provisions194 that seem to run afoul of INS v. Chadha.195 
In some areas, courts defer to political institutions in constitutional 
interpretation. Although Marbury said that courts could exercise jurisdiction 
over executive officials when they allegedly violated individual rights,196 it 
recognized that sometimes political actors are given discretion such that 
their conduct is not subject to judicial jurisdiction.197 Under the “political 
question” doctrine, the Court has recognized a broader set of situations that 
are committed to political institutions, namely Congress (or one house or the 
other) or the President.198 These matters are nonjusticiable because either the 
Constitution delegates decision-making and interpretative authority to a 
coordinate political institution or the Court determines there are no judicial 
materials to fashion or implement a governing rule or standard.199 Thus, in 
Nixon v. United States,200 the Court held that the Senate, not the Court, could 
interpret the Constitution’s Impeachment Trial Clause because the 
Constitution’s text committed that issue to the Senate, not the judiciary,201 
and because of an absence of judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards to interpret “try.”202 
 
 190. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
 191. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 192. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 193. Fallon, supra note 189, at 498–500. 
 194. Louis Fisher, The Unitary Executive and Inherent Executive Power, 12 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 569, 581 (2010). 
 195. 462 U.S. 919, 942–43 (1983) (holding legislative veto provision unconstitutional). 
 196. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803). 
 197. Id. 
 198. See, e.g., Lain, supra note 26, at 1629–30 (discussing how political question and 
other justiciability doctrines leave some constitutional decision-making to political branches). 
 199. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (stating that the factors that make the 
issue a political question include the textual commitment of the issue to a political 
department or the absence of judicial standards). 
 200. 506 U.S. 224 (1993). 
 201. Id. at 230–32. 
 202. Id. at 229–30. 
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Sometimes Congress or the President has interpretive authority because 
no person has standing to bring an issue to federal court. Thus, the Court 
dismissed suits to bar congressmen from serving in the military reserve203 
and requiring the Central Intelligence Agency budget to be published204 on 
the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked sufficient interest to raise those 
challenges. At times, the Court concludes that it cannot formulate 
constitutional restraints even though it recognizes that political departments 
might do so. Thus, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority205 the Court deemed itself unable to fashion a standard to insulate 
states from generally applicable regulatory legislation, although it concluded 
that Congress might protect the states.206 These examples, among others, 
rebut Cooper’s claim that Marbury and American history established 
universal judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation. 
The Court’s assertion of judicial supremacy in Cooper has proved 
controversial.207 To some extent, the pushback against the claim related to 
the exaggerated reading of Marbury and from its inadequacy as a descriptive 
account of American constitutional experience. Moreover, even some 
sympathetic to the result in Cooper208 questioned the Court’s language 
giving its decision the status accorded constitutional provisions under the 
Supremacy Clause.209 There is a logical problem with considering the 
constitutional interpretation in a Supreme Court decision, even one like 
Brown, as the supreme law of the land. If the Court’s decisions have that 
status, presumably they bind not only political actors, but judges as well.210 
Yet the Court often overrules earlier decisions especially in constitutional 
cases, where legislative correction is impossible. As Justice Brandeis put it, 
 
 203. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974). 
 204. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). 
 205. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
 206. Id. at 550–52. 
 207. See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Cooper v. Aaron and the Faces of Federalism, 52 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 1087, 1092 (2008); Justin Driver, Supremacies and the Southern Manifesto, 92 
TEX. L. REV. 1053, 1102–03 (2014) (stating that Cooper has been widely criticized for 
articulating some “dubious” propositions); Farber, supra note 17, at 388 (stating that Cooper 
generated “scathing attack from commentators” and giving examples); Strauss, supra note 4, 
at 1080 (calling Cooper’s assertion of judicial supremacy “highly controversial”); Wilkinson, 
supra note 19, at 520 (stating that the Court went “somewhat overboard”). 
 208. See, e.g., PHILIP B. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE WARREN COURT 
185–86 (1970) (expressing support for Cooper yet stating misgivings regarding the idea of 
giving Supreme Court decisions Supremacy Clause status). 
 209. See, e.g., id. at 185 (questioning the “elevation of Supreme Court decisions to 
inclusion in the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution”). 
 210. See, e.g., id. (referring to the “immutability of constitutional decisions” implicit in 
viewing them as part of supreme law); Strauss, supra note 4, at 1080–81 (suggesting a logical 
problem with requiring other branches of the national government to comply with judicial 
decisions which the Court may overturn). 
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“The Court bows to the lessons of experience and the force of better 
reasoning, recognizing that the process of trial and error, so fruitful in the 
physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial function.”211 Brown, of 
course, effectively overruled Plessy. If a Supreme Court decision was part of 
the supreme law of the land, how was Plessy overruled?212 Moreover, 
Professor Philip Kurland thought the Court’s formulation equating the 
Court’s decisions with the Constitution made it difficult to even suggest that 
the Court overturn a precedent.213 
The view that the Court’s rulings are equivalent to the Constitution, 
also suggests that constitutional meaning is fixed and certain, not dynamic 
and the subject of dispute, as many believe. Judge Wilkinson argued that 
Cooper’s language “[t]aken literally” compelled non-party officials “to 
immediately support, both in word and in deed, whatever the Court has 
said,”214 but that cannot have been the Court’s intent since “taken literally” 
that formulation would foreclose criticism of a decision or any action to 
change it. A Court that had just effectively overruled a century-old 
precedent based on the argument that, whatever its initial merit, it no longer 
constituted equal protection,215 could not have intended a meaning that 
would forever freeze doctrine in place.216 In fact, it is more plausible to think 
that the Court viewed its decisions as entitled to respect under the 
Supremacy Clause, not because they were part of the Constitution but 
because they were the product of an authorized exercise of constitutional 
power,217 a form of constitutional common law that was binding until 
properly changed.218 
Professor Tribe has suggested a narrower reading of Cooper’s judicial 
supremacy claim as applying essentially to Brown and its progeny and 
claiming that they had binding effect such that state officials who interfered 
with their enforcement “or act to undermine its goals” act “unlawfully.”219 
This view would leave officials free to engage in nonjusticiable behavior 
inconsistent with the Court’s interpretation.220 
 
 211. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407–08 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
 212. KURLAND, supra note 208, at 185–86. 
 213. Id. at 186. 
 214. Wilkinson, supra note 19, at 520. 
 215. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492–95 (1954). 
 216. See also Recent Attacks upon the Supreme Court: A Statement by Members of the 
Bar, supra note 41, at 1128 (statement of prominent lawyers recognizing that critics of a 
Supreme Court decision may properly criticize it and seek an “overruling decision”). 
 217. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 257 (3d ed. 2000). 
 218. Farber, supra note 17, at 409, 410–11. 
 219. TRIBE, supra note 217, at 257. 
 220. Id. at 258. 
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Although the Court’s claim in Cooper was inaccurate, it was not 
without some basis. Justin Driver argues persuasively that Cooper did not 
invent a new doctrine of judicial supremacy but “merely amplified” an 
existing notion that courts “enjoyed a privileged role” in constitutional 
interpretation.221 Generally speaking, political actors do follow the Court’s 
constitutional decisions, even when those decisions impose unpalatable 
outcomes.222 In his classic, The American Supreme Court, which first 
appeared in 1960, but was apparently completed before Cooper was issued 
since it did not mention Little Rock, Robert G. McCloskey wrote that the 
power of judicial review 
must be nourished and cultivated so that it will grow into the doctrine of 
judicial sovereignty, or the idea that a law may be held unconstitutional 
if the Court thinks it is, even though the case is not plain, and that the 




In part, what McCloskey called judicial sovereignty is widely 
recognized because the Court exercises its authority in areas that political 
leaders and most citizens “accept as lying within the lawful bounds of 
judicial authority.”224 Put differently, the Court generally stays in the lanes 
that have been constructed as appropriate for judicial intervention and does 
not trespass in those where political discretion seems warranted. The Court 
encourages acquiescence through its selective assertion of power and 
through the manner in which it acts. Court rationales have presumptive, not 
absolute, finality,225 and Presidents and others generally follow the Court’s 
constitutional interpretations because of public expectations and because 
judicial behavior generally invites acceptance.226 
 
 221. Driver, supra note 207, at 1102. 
 222. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (deciding, 5-4, that recount of Florida 
electoral votes must end, thereby effectively determining that Governor George W. Bush had 
won Florida’s electoral votes and the presidency); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 
(1974) (deciding, 8-0, that President Richard M. Nixon must produce certain White House 
tapes that showed that he was complicit in the cover-up of the Watergate break-in from an 
early point); Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997) (declining, 8-0, to stay, during his 
presidency, a civil case against President Bill Clinton arising out of alleged pre-presidential 
behavior); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (deciding, 6-3, 
that Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer unconstitutionally seized and operated the steel 
mills pursuant to President Harry S. Truman’s order). 
 223. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 59, at 30. 
 224. Fallon, supra note 189, at 494. 
 225. Id. at 507. 
 226. Id. at 507–08. 
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IV. JUDICIAL SUPREMACY IN A FEDERALISM CONTEXT 
In a sense, though, the Court’s discussion of judicial supremacy in 
Cooper, especially its reliance on Marbury as the source of that doctrine, 
was beside the point, or beside most of the point. Marbury involved a 
situation quite different from that in Cooper. As previously mentioned, in 
Marbury the Court interpreted the Constitution to find the case not within its 
own original subject matter jurisdiction and accordingly did not need 
acquiescence or external support to enforce its judgment or rationale.227 By 
contrast, Cooper addressed the refusal of officials to abide by newly-
promulgated Supreme Court doctrine regarding the operation of public 
schools those officials had a part in running.228 Accordingly, in Little Rock, 
unlike in Marbury, the Court very much depended on external acquiescence 
and support. Moreover, Marbury involved a separation of powers dispute in 
which the Court reviewed, and found unconstitutional, an act of Congress.229 
By contrast, Cooper involved a federalism controversy in which state 
officials rejected their obligation to follow federal court orders and the 
Court’s new interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause as expressed in 
Brown.230 Indeed, the latter part of the Court’s judicial supremacy 
formulation in Cooper implicitly recognized this distinction since it spoke of 
the Supremacy Clause binding the states to follow the Court’s 
interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment (which itself limits the states) 
and since it specifically concluded that the Oath Clause binds “[e]very state 
legislator and executive and judicial officer” to support the Constitution.231 
Ashutosh Bhagwat has perceptively observed that much of the critical 
discussion of Cooper’s judicial supremacy statement has addressed the role 
of the Court relative to coordinate branches of the federal government and 
accordingly is misdirected since the thrust of the Cooper comment was to 
 
 227. See supra text accompanying notes 179–80. 
 228. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
 229. See supra text accompanying notes 179–80. 
 230. Cf. Van Alstyne, supra note 149, at 37 (stating that Marbury does not involve any 
question of the role of states in constitutional interpretation); Charles Warren, Earliest Cases 
of Judicial Review of State Legislation by Federal Courts, 32 YALE L.J. 15, 15 (1922) (stating 
that power of federal judicial review of Congressional and state statutes involves different 
considerations). But see MCCLOSKEY, supra note 59, at 44 (arguing that Marbury rationales 
for judicial review are broadly stated to apply to state as well as national legislation). 
 231. 358 U.S. at 18 (“It follows that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the 
Constitution makes it of binding effect on the States ‘any Thing in the Constitution or Laws 
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.’ Every state legislator and executive and 
judicial officer is solemnly committed by oath taken pursuant to Art. VI, cl. 3 ‘to support this 
Constitution.’”). 
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make a “more modest statement” regarding the obligations of state, not 
national, officials.232 
The arguments for judicial supremacy in a federalism context differ 
from, and are stronger than, in the separation of powers context. There are 
textual, historical, structural, and pragmatic reasons why the Court’s 
decisions should enjoy a stronger presumption of applicability to non-parties 
in a federalism context than regarding a separation of powers issues, and 
some doctrine tends to recognize that distinction. Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr. famously opined, “I do not think the United States would come 
to an end if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think 
the Union would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the 
laws of the several States.”233 Although Holmes spoke of the relative 
importance of two species of judicial review, what might be called 
horizontal versus vertical judicial review, not judicial supremacy, the 
reasons making judicial review more important vertically than horizontally 
also inform the discussion regarding judicial supremacy in the federalism 
versus separation of powers context. 
A federal system needs an umpire to resolve disputes between various 
levels of government and the Court has largely inherited that role.234 James 
Madison apparently recognized greater deference to the federal judiciary in 
deciding federalism controversies than those involving its coordinate 
branches.235 Indeed, the text supports that conclusion: in the Supremacy 
Clause,236 which makes federal law prevail over state law and binds state 
judges to follow federal law in preference to the law from the state of which 
they are an officer; the Oath Clause,237 which requires all state officers and 
 
 232. Bhagwat, supra note 207, at 1093. 
 233. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Law and the Court: Speech at a Dinner of the Harvard 
Law School Association of New York, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 291, 295–96 (1920); see 
also PAUL A. FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS BUSINESS, PURPOSES, 
AND PERFORMANCE 99 (1961) (justifying judicial review primarily as “restraint on state 
action”). 
 234. COX, supra note 156, at 21–22 (“The peculiar nature of our federal system also gives 
rise to the need for somebody to manage the interplay between State and federal law and 
State and federal courts.”). 
 235. KRAMER, supra note 149, at 186–87. 
 236. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any 
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). 
 237. Id. cl. 3 (“The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of 
the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United 
States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this 
Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or 
public Trust under the United States.”). 
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legislators to obey the Constitution; the grant of subject matter jurisdiction 
to the federal courts of a range of cases in which states are parties; and the 
grant of appellate jurisdiction to the Court in cases or controversies within 
most of the categories Article III assigns the federal courts.238 
Judicial supremacy is implicit in two basic functions of a Supreme 
Court in a federalist system—protecting the supremacy and promoting the 
uniformity of national law.239 The Supremacy Clause implies federal judicial 
power to subject the actions of state officials to constitutional review.240 
Indeed, the federal structure of the Constitution implied a constitutional 
value that federal constitutional and statutory law should have uniform 
meaning. A central function of federal courts, especially the Supreme Court, 
is to provide a consistent interpretation for federal law such that its meaning 
does not vary in different jurisdictions.241 
Although Marbury did not consider whether the Court’s constitutional 
decisions bound state officials, other Marshall Court cases addressed that 
subject. In Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,242 Virginia acknowledged the 
supremacy of federal law but argued that its highest court had final 
interpretive power in cases brought before it.243 The Court, speaking through 
Justice Joseph Story, rejected this contention. The Constitution gave the 
Supreme Court, not the highest state court, this constitutional power.244 
Justice Story further affirmed the Court’s power to declare null and void the 
acts of each branch of the state government to preserve the supremacy of 
federal law.245 The Court also invoked the importance of uniformity in 
 
 238. Ashutosh Bhagwat has suggested that state executive and legislative officials may 
have greater leeway to resist the Constitution since the Supremacy Clause speaks directly to 
state judges, since Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee established a hierarchy between the Court and 
state judiciaries, and to promote judicial efficiency. Bhagwat, supra note 207, at 1099–1100. 
Yet if the Supremacy Clause commits state judges to follow constitutional interpretations of 
the Court, the Oath Clause would seem to require that state political actors comply with those 
same decisions and doctrine. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 217, at 255 (noting that the Oath 
Clause has been used to compel state nonjudicial officials to comply with the Constitution). 
 239. Paul A. Freund, A Supreme Court in a Federation: Some Lessons from Legal 
History, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 597, 615 (1953) (“The supreme court in federation has two 
principal functions: to maintain the supremacy of the constitution and to promote the 
uniformity of law.”). 
 240. POWELL, supra note 170, at 16, 22. 
 241. Freund, supra note 239, at 598 (“Every federation has thought it necessary to 
establish a supreme court which performs the twofold function of interpreting the constitution 
and promoting uniformity of law.”). 
 242. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
 243. Id. at 346–47. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. at 344 (“The courts of the United States can, without question, revise the 
proceedings of the executive and legislative authorities of the states, and if they are found to 
be contrary to the constitution, may declare them to be of no legal validity. Surely the 
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federal law to justify Supreme Court review of state court decisions 
regarding matters of federal law.246 
In Cohens v. Virginia,247 Chief Justice Marshall rejected Virginia’s 
argument that the Constitution allowed each state to interpret the ultimate 
meaning of the Constitution and federal law.248 The Constitution made clear, 
by its structure and its text, that “[t]he general government, though limited 
as to its objects, is supreme with respect to those objects.”249 The federal 
judiciary was charged “to decide all cases of every description arising under 
the Constitution or laws of the United States” in order to vindicate the 
Constitution’s principles.250 He reaffirmed this principle, asking rhetorically: 
Is it so improbable that they should confer on the judicial department the 
power of construing the Constitution and laws of the Union in every 
case, in the last resort, and of preserving them from all violation from 
every quarter, so far as judicial decisions can preserve them, that this 




There Marshall reaffirmed that the federal courts existed to protect the 
Constitution and federal law from state intrusions.252 Echoing Story’s 
arguments regarding the Court’s role in preserving the supremacy and 
uniformity of federal law, Marshall wrote: 
 
exercise of the same right over judicial tribunals is not a higher or more dangerous act of 
sovereign power.”). 
 246. Id. at 347–48 (“That motive is the importance, and even necessity, of uniformity of 
decisions throughout the whole United States upon all subjects within the purview of the 
constitution. Judges of equal learning and integrity in different States might differently 
interpret a statute or a treaty of the United States, or even the constitution itself; if there were 
no revising authority to control these jarring and discordant judgments and harmonize them 
into uniformity, the laws, the treaties, and the constitution of the United States would be 
different in different states, and might perhaps never have precisely the same construction, 
obligation, or efficacy in any two states. The public mischiefs that would attend such a state 
of things would be truly deplorable, and it cannot be believed that they could have escaped 
the enlightened convention which formed the Constitution.”). 
 247. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). 
 248. Id. at 377 (“[T]he constitution of the United States has provided no tribunal for the 
final construction of itself, or of the laws or treaties of the nation; but that this power may be 
exercised in the last resort by the Courts of every State in the Union. That the constitution, 
laws, and treaties may receive as many constructions as there are States; and that this is not a 
mischief, or, if a mischief, is irremediable.”). 
 249. Id. at 381. 
 250. Id. at 382. 
 251. Id. at 388. 
 252. Id. at 391 (“A more important, a much more interesting, object was the preservation 
of the Constitution and laws of the United States, so far as they can be preserved by judicial 
authority, and therefore the jurisdiction of the Courts of the Union was expressly extended to 
all cases arising under that Constitution and those laws.”). 
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Dismissing the unpleasant suggestion that any motives which may not be 
fairly avowed, or which ought not to exist, can ever influence a State or 
its Courts, the necessity of uniformity, as well as correctness in 
expounding the Constitution and laws of the United States, would itself 
suggest the propriety of vesting in some single tribunal the power of 
deciding, in the last resort, all cases in which they are involved.
253
 
After invoking Marbury, Cooper cited in passing Ableman v. Booth254 
for the proposition that the Constitution imposed an oath on state office-
holders in order to preserve the Constitution, but elsewhere in the opinion 
Ableman came much closer to articulating a doctrine of judicial supremacy 
in a federalism context than did Marbury. Having assisted in the escape of a 
fugitive slave from federal custody, Ableman was arrested for violating the 
federal Fugitive Slave Law but then released on order of the Wisconsin state 
courts.255 The federal government appealed to the Supreme Court arguing 
that the actions of Wisconsin’s courts was unlawful.256 The Court agreed.257 
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Taney echoed the structural 
arguments from Hunter’s Lessee and Cohens regarding the Court’s role in 
preserving the supremacy and uniformity of federal law.258 It was necessary 
that a federal tribunal be created so cases arising under federal law “should 
be finally and conclusively decided.”259 The Supreme Court’s “ultimate 
appellate power” was essential to preserve the supremacy and uniformity of 
federal law.260 Moreover, since federal and state courts might often differ 
regarding constitutional and legal interpretation, the constitutional system 
required a Supreme Court to resolve disputes “finally and with out 
appeal.”261 States were bound to support the Constitution “[a]nd no power is 
 
 253. Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 416. 
 254. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859). 
 255. Id. at 507–08, 511. 
 256. Id. at 511–14. 
 257. Id. at 526. 
 258. Id. at 517–18 (“But the supremacy thus conferred on this Government could not 
peacefully be maintained, unless it was clothed with judicial power equally paramount in 
authority to carry it into execution; for if left to the courts of justice of the several States, 
conflicting decisions would unavoidably take place, and the local tribunals could hardly be 
expected to be always free from the local influences of which we have spoken. And the 
Constitution and laws and treaties of the United States, and the powers granted to the Federal 
Government, would soon receive different interpretations in different States, and the 
Government of the United States would soon become one thing in one State and another 
thing in another.”); id. at 518 (stating that Supreme Court was needed “to secure the 
independence and supremacy” of the federal government and to make the Constitution and 
federal law uniform). 
 259. Id. 
 260. Ableman, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 518. 
 261. Id. at 519–20 (“And as the courts of a State, and the courts of the United States, 
might, and indeed certainly would, often differ as to the extent of the powers conferred by the 
194 UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
more clearly conferred by the Constitution and laws of the United States 
than the power of this court to decide, ultimately and finally, all cases 
arising under such Constitution and laws[.]”262 
To be sure, Martin, Cohens, and Ableman spoke of the Court’s role 
resolving cases on final appeal rather than making the sort of sweeping 
statement the Court made in Cooper. Yet the underlying values of 
supremacy and uniformity of federal law could only be served if the 
meanings the Court inferred from the Constitution were generally binding. If 
the Court’s analysis applied only in the case decided, inconsistent behavior 
in other jurisdictions could frustrate the purposes behind Supreme Court 
appellate review by subordinating federal law or construing and applying it 
differently than the Court did. 
The adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 signaled further 
subordination of state government to constitutional norms within the broad 
area it covered. In a single sentence, the Amendment protected as against 
adverse state action privileges or immunities of United States citizens and 
prohibited states from denying persons the equal protection of the laws or 
life, liberty, or property without due process of law.263 The language 
suggested the constitutionalization of a range of rights, thereby limiting state 
autonomy.264 In The Slaughter-House Cases,265 Justice Miller, writing for 
the majority, recognized that an expansive reading of the Fourteenth 
Amendment would make the Supreme Court “a perpetual censor upon all 
legislation of the States, on the civil rights of their own citizens, with 
authority to nullify such as it did not approve as consistent with those rights, 
as they existed at the time of the adoption of this amendment.”266 Justice 
Miller rejected the proposition that the Amendment protected white butchers 
from the state-created monopoly there in question, but he did not deny that it 
gave the Court such broad power over state authorities regarding claims of 
African-Americans alleging racial discrimination, the class he identified as 
its intended beneficiaries.267 The imposition of new constitutional norms on 
 
General Government, it was manifest that serious controversies would arise between the 
authorities of the United States and of the States, which must be settled by force of arms, 
unless some tribunal was created to decide between them finally and with out appeal.”); see 
also id. at 520 (describing the Supreme Court as exercising “final appellate power” so 
disputes could be “finally settled”). 
 262. Id. at 525. 
 263. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 264. Joel K. Goldstein, Teaching the Transformative Fourteenth Amendment, 62 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 581 (2018). 
 265. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). 
 266. Id. at 78. 
 267. Id. at 67–68, 71–72, 81. 
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the states through the Fourteenth Amendment268 expanded the Court’s role 
as constitutional reviewer in a federalism context and the uniformity and 
supremacy imperatives suggested that the doctrine produced should apply to 
non-parties.269 
The idea that state officials needed to defer to federal judges regarding 
the meaning of the Constitution or federal statutes was hardly a heretical 
idea. Indeed, in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,270 the Court’s most 
significant recognition of state judicial power in the twentieth century, the 
Court, implicitly and explicitly, recognized areas in which the Supreme 
Court enjoyed interpretive supremacy. Since Erie held that state legislatures 
and highest courts were supreme regarding state law and were entitled to 
deference from federal courts in those spheres,271 the mirror image would 
also seem to follow, that the Supreme Court’s constitutional interpretations 
were authoritative vis-à-vis state officials.272 Justice Louis Brandeis did not 
leave that point wholly to inference, although his formulation might have 
been more broadly stated.273 
Finally, the practical exigencies of governing a federal system would 
seem to require greater deference to Court decisions in a vertical than 
horizontal context. In criticizing the sweep of the Court’s judicial supremacy 
pronouncement, Kurland had argued that Brown did not bind non-parties 
like Arkansas but provided a precedent that courts needed to follow in other 
litigation, including that involving the Little Rock schools, and that when 
followed, the lower federal or state court decisions became part of the 
supreme law of the land.274 In such litigation, Arkansas officials could 
appeal to the Court and ask it to revisit or overrule Brown, but absent such 
judicial action the state officials were bound to follow the lower court 
order.275 Yet such an approach creates the possibility of an endless series of 
challenges to judicial decisions as various local jurisdictions refuse to 
 
 268. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 22–30 (1980). 
 269. But see Eisgruber, supra note 162, at 81–84 (arguing that Fourteenth Amendment 
undercuts argument for judicial supremacy). 
 270. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 271. Id. at 78 (“Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of 
Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State. And whether the law of the 
State shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not 
a matter of federal concern.”). 
 272. See Farber, supra note 17, at 390. 
 273. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (“Supervision over either the legislative or the judicial action of 
the States is in no case permissible except as to matters by the constitution specifically 
authorized or delegated to the United States.”). 
 274. KURLAND, supra note 208, at 117–18. 
 275. Id. 
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comply with a Court constitutional interpretation until it is applied to them 
through litigation and judgment. 
Although the Court had not previously issued a Cooper-like statement 
of judicial supremacy in a federalism context, the theory enjoyed significant 
jurisprudential support. In 1938, then Professor Felix Frankfurter had termed 
“the special function of the Supreme Court . . . to mediate between the 
individual and government, and to mark the boundaries between state and 
national action.”276 Frankfurter continued that “[t]he Court is the final 
authority in adjusting the relationships of the individual to the separate 
states, of the individual to the United States, of the forty-eight states to one 
another, and of the states to the Union.”277 
Almost two years before the Court decided Cooper, leading American 
lawyers issued a statement that sounded many of the themes that case later 
articulated. The December 1956 pronouncement, which leading lawyers and 
law scholars signed, declared that “[i]n cases of disagreement” the federal 
judiciary existed “to interpret the Constitution for us” with the Supreme 
Court being “the embodiment of judicial power.”278 Individuals might 
disagree with a Supreme Court decision or seek to have it reversed by a 
subsequent Supreme Court decision or constitutional amendment, but they 
had “a duty to recognize the decision as the supreme law of the land as long 
as it remains in force.”279 The Court may not have asserted its supremacy in 
constitutional interpretation before Cooper, but there was support for some 
version of such a position in a federalism context, and the proposition found 
some support among leading lawyers. 
V. EISENHOWER AND JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 
President Eisenhower was among those who embraced the idea that 
Supreme Court decisions bound other officials. Although President 
Eisenhower has been criticized for failing to provide more enthusiastic 
support for Brown,280 the actions of Eisenhower and his administration were 
important in the Court’s articulation of judicial supremacy in Cooper. 
Eisenhower did not champion Brown,281 but he did embrace the idea that the 
 
 276. FELIX FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT 5 (1938). 
 277. Id. 
 278. Recent Attacks upon the Supreme Court: A Statement by Members of the Bar, supra 
note 41, at 1128. 
 279. Id. 
 280. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 281. See, e.g., The President’s News Conference of August 11, 1954, 1954 PUB. PAPERS 
696, 700 (Aug. 11, 1954) (stating that “the subject has not even been mentioned to me” in 
response to question whether he had considered asking Congress to legislate to enforce 
school integration). 
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Supreme Court was the supreme constitutional expositor and that he was 
bound to enforce federal court orders.282 He articulated those ideas 
frequently after the Court decided Brown especially after he was re-elected 
in 1956 and in 1957 and 1958 with reference to Little Rock. 
When Eisenhower was questioned in his regular press conference 
whether he had any advice for the South two days after the Court’s decision 
in Brown, he said, in pertinent part, “The Supreme Court has spoken and I 
am sworn to uphold the constitutional processes in this country; and I will 
obey.”283 The following year, Eisenhower told the American Bar 
Association that one product of Chief Justice John Marshall’s work had 
been “to create among Americans a deep feeling of trust and respect for the 
Judiciary.”284 When asked about efforts to include an anti-discrimination 
requirement in the School Construction Bill, Eisenhower again stated his 
commitment to the Court’s decisions which he characterized as 
“complete”285 even while suggesting that the rider should be left out,286 
especially since the Court had said desegregation should be implemented 
gradually.287 
When asked in February 1956 about his reaction to the interposition 
resolutions four states had passed denying that the Supreme Court was the 
ultimate constitutional interpreter, Eisenhower obfuscated, but his answer 
implicitly accepted the binding nature of the Court’s decision even as he 
 
 282. See, e.g., Driver, supra note 207, at 1116–18 (providing brief discussion of 
Eisenhower’s support for judicial supremacy). 
 283. The President’s News Conference of May 19, 1954, 1954 PUB. PAPERS 489, 491 
(May 19, 1954); see also The President’s News Conference of November 23, 1954, 1954 
PUB. PAPERS 1060, 1066 (Nov. 23, 1954) (“[T]he Supreme Court has ruled what the law is in 
this case, what the Constitution means.”). 
 284. Address at the Annual Convention of the American Bar Association, Philadelphia, 
1955 PUB. PAPERS 802, 803 (Aug. 24, 1955). 
 285. The President’s News Conference of January 25, 1956, 1956 PUB. PAPERS 182, 186 
(Jan. 25, 1956) (“Now, when it comes to my devotion to the Constitution—what it 
provides—my devotion to the decisions of the Supreme Court, particularly when they are 
unanimous, I hope is complete.”). 
 286. Id. (“Now, it isn’t though quite as simple as that. If we go to the other end and begin 
to talk about laws, I believe that every law, every important bill, and every important purpose 
from Congress should be in a bill of its own, so that we don’t get a confusion of issues and, 
therefore, don’t know for what we are voting or what we are not voting for.”). 
 287. Id. (“The Supreme Court, in reaching its decision as to what the law was, provided, 
and specifically provided, there be a gradual implementation, and referred it back to the 
district courts so that it should be gradual.”); id. (“But I just think that is the way I would 
handle it, to put it very clearly, because we want the schools now; and as much as the 
decision of the Supreme Court must be implemented, they said themselves, implemented 
gradually, because they recognize the deep ruts of prejudice and emotionalism that have been 
built up over the years in this problem.”). 
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emphasized that the Court called for gradual implementation.288 When 
Eisenhower was asked the following month about the Southern Manifesto, 
his answer implicitly accepted the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the 
Constitution as binding.289 And when asked about the possibility that some 
 
 288. The President’s News Conference of February 29, 1956, 1956 PUB. PAPERS 263, 
269–70 (Feb. 29, 1956) (“William V. Shannon, New York Post: As you may know, four of 
the southern State legislatures have passed interposition resolutions stating that the 
Supreme Court decision outlawing segregation has no force and effect in their States; and I 
was wondering what you thought about this concept of interposition, and what you thought 
was the role of the Federal Government in enforcing the Supreme Court decision? THE 
PRESIDENT. Well, of course, you have asked a very vast question that is filled with 
argument on both sides. You have raised the question of States rights versus Federal power; 
you have particularly brought up the question whether the Supreme Court is the last word we 
have in the interpretation of our Constitution. Now, this is what I say: there are adequate legal 
means of determining all of these factors. The Supreme Court has issued its own operational 
directives and delegated power to the district courts. I expect that we are going to make 
progress, and the Supreme Court itself said it does not expect revolutionary action suddenly 
executed. We will make progress, and I am not going to attempt to tell them how it is going 
to be done.”). 
 289. The President’s News Conference of March 14, 1956, 1956 PUB. PAPERS 301, 303–
05 (Mar. 14, 1956) (“Edward P. Morgan, American Broadcasting Company: Mr. President, 
southern members of Congress, including a couple of Republicans, have posed a direct 
challenge to both the other branches of Government, first, in the implied if not declared threat 
to block your appointments to the judiciary, which might find disfavor on the racial issue; 
and, second, in a manifesto which was introduced in Congress on Monday, in which some 
100 members of the House and Senate commit themselves to try to overturn the 
Supreme Court decision on segregation. Would you comment on those developments, sir, 
particularly with reference to what you think the Executive responsibility is and should be. 
THE PRESIDENT. Well, you are asking a question that we are probably going to be busy on 
for a while. First, I have nothing whatsoever to say about their right to confirm or not 
confirm. The constitutional duty of the Senate to act as it sees fit upon the nominations sent 
up by the President is clear. I could urge publicly, and I probably would if I thought there 
were unnecessary blocks, but that is their business, and that doesn’t call, as I see it, for any 
further comment. Now, the first thing about the manifesto is this: that they say they are going 
to use every legal means. No one in any responsible position anywhere has talked 
nullification; there would be a place where we get to a very bad spot for the simple reason I 
am sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution of the United States and, of course, I can 
never abandon or refuse to carry out my own duty. Let us remember that the 
Supreme Court itself talked about emotionalism in this question, and it was for that reason 
that it said, ‘Progress must be gradual.’ Now, let us not forget there has been some progress. I 
believe there is something on the order of more than a quarter of a million of Negro children 
in the border and some southern States, that have been integrated in the schools, and except 
for a certain area in which the difficulties are greatest, there has been progress. As a matter of 
fact, there was not long ago a decision by the Supreme Court of Texas to the general effect 
that anything in the laws or in the Constitution of the State of Texas that was in defiance of 
the Constitution of the United States was null and void. So, let us remember that there are 
people who are ready to approach this thing with moderation, but with the determination to 
make the progress that the Supreme Court asked for. If ever there was a time when we must 
be patient without being complacent, when we must be understanding of other people’s deep 
emotions as well as our own, this is it. Extremists on neither side are going to help this 
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of his supporters might defy the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown, he 
replied in part that “when we carry this to the ultimate, remember that the 
Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, is our basic law,”290 
essentially the claim the Court later made in Cooper. On October 11, 1956, 
Eisenhower reaffirmed his obligation to enforce the Constitution as 
interpreted by the Supreme Court.291 Although some of Eisenhower’s 
answers could have been clearer,292 Eisenhower essentially adhered to the 
 
situation, and we can only believe that the good sense, the common sense, of Americans will 
bring this thing along. The length of time I am not even going to talk about; I don’t know 
anything about the length of time it will take. We are not talking here about coercing, using 
force in a general way; we are simply going to uphold the Constitution of the United States, 
see that the progress as ordered by them is carried out. Now, let us remember this one thing, 
and it is very important: the people who have this deep emotional reaction on the other side 
were not acting over these past three generations in defiance of law. They were acting in 
compliance with the law as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States under the 
decision of 1896. Now, that has been completely reversed, and it is going to take time for 
them to adjust their thinking and their progress to that. But I have never yet given up my 
belief that the American people, faced with a great problem like this, will approach it 
intelligently and with patience and with understanding, and we will get somewhere; and I do 
deplore any great extreme action on either side.”). 
 290. The President’s News Conference of March 21, 1956, 1956 PUB. PAPERS 327, 340 
(Mar. 21, 1956). 
 291. The President’s News Conference of October 11, 1956, 1956 PUB. PAPERS 880, 884 
(Oct. 11, 1956) (“Charles W. Roberts, Newsweek: On September 5 you stated that it was not 
important whether you endorsed the Supreme Court’s decision on integration so long as it 
was enforced. Since then a number of people, mostly Democrats, have said that it is 
important whether you endorse the decision. Could you amplify your position on that? THE 
PRESIDENT. Look, I put that in this way: We start out with article I of the Constitution, and 
we go on right down to the end, including its amendments, and the Constitution as it is 
interpreted by the Supreme Court, I am sworn to uphold it. I don’t ask myself whether every 
single phase of that Constitution, with all its amendments, are exactly what I agree with or 
not. I am sworn to uphold it, and that is what I intend to do.”). 
 292. The President’s News Conference of September 3, 1957, 1957 PUB. PAPERS 639, 
640–41 (Sept. 3, 1957) (“Merriman Smith, United Press: Mr. President, over quite a wide 
section of the South today and this week, children are going back to school under difficult 
circumstances, in places where integration is being attempted for the first time. We have a 
case in Arkansas this morning where the Governor has ordered State troops around a school 
that a Federal court had ordered integrated. I just wonder what you think of this situation. 
THE PRESIDENT. Well, first, to say ‘what you think about it’ is sort of a broad subject that 
you are giving me. Actually, this particular incident came to my attention the first thing this 
morning. I have been in contact with the Attorney General’s office. They are taking a look at 
it. They are going to find out exactly what has happened, and discuss this with the Federal 
judge. As of this moment, I cannot say anything further about the particular point, because 
that is all I know about it. Now, time and again a number of people—I, among them—have 
argued that you cannot change people’s hearts merely by laws. Laws presumably express the 
conscience of a nation and its determination or will to do something. But the laws here are to 
be executed gradually, according to the dictum of the Supreme Court, and I understand that 
the plan worked out by the school board of Little Rock was approved by the district judge. I 
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idea that he would enforce the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme 
Court. 
As the situation in Little Rock gained prominence, Eisenhower said as 
much in a telegram to Faubus in September 1957.293 “When I became 
President, I took an oath to support and defend the Constitution of the 
United States,” Eisenhower wrote.294 “The only assurance I can give you is 
that the Federal Constitution will be upheld by me by every legal means at 
my command.”295 Eisenhower denied that federal authorities were 
considering arresting Faubus or had tapped his phone lines and expressed 
confidence that he and other Arkansas authorities including the National 
Guard would cooperate with the federal court.296 He also consistently argued 
that as President he was obligated to support decisions of federal courts.297 
 
believe it is a ten-year plan. Now there seems to have been a road block thrown in the way of 
that plan, and the next decision will have to be by the lawyers and jurists.”). 
 293. Telegram on Assurance to the Governor, supra note 83, at 659; see also President’s 
Statement After Meeting with Governor, supra note 89, at 674. 
 294. Telegram on Assurance to the Governor, supra note 83, at 659. 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. 
 297. The President’s News Conference of May 14, 1958, 1958 PUB. PAPERS 394, 397 
(May 14, 1958) (“That is right, to obey a court order; and that is the point. I did not send 
troops anywhere because of an argument or a statement by a governor about segregation. 
There was a court order, and there was not only mob interference with the execution of that 
order, but there was a statement by the Governor that he would not intervene to see that 
that court order would be exercised. That is exactly what I did. Now, I don’t know, I am not 
going to try to predict what the exact circumstances in any other case will be. But I do say 
this: I deplore the need or the use of troops anywhere to get American citizens to obey the 
orders of constituted courts; because I want to point this one thing out: there is no person in 
this room whose basic rights are not involved in any successful defiance to the carrying out 
of court orders. For example, let us assume one of you were arrested, and you were arrested 
by a sheriff who didn’t think what you were doing in the particular town was correct, and the 
town was inflamed against you; but the Federal judge says—this taking place, let’s say, on 
some Federal property—the Federal judge comes in and says he will issue a writ of habeas 
corpus. You are in jail, unjustly, illegally, unconstitutionally; but there is no power there—the 
governor won’t intervene; the marshal of the court is powerless; no one can do anything. 
Now, what is a President going to do? That is a question you people answer for yourselves. I 
answered it for myself.”); Statement by the President Concerning the Removal of the Soldiers 
Stationed at Little Rock, 1958 PUB. PAPERS 387, 387 (May 8, 1958) (“I trust that state and 
local officials and citizens will assume their full responsibility and duty for seeing that the 
orders of the federal Court are not obstructed. The faithful execution of this responsibility 
will make it unnecessary for the federal Government to act further to preserve the integrity of 
our judicial processes.”); The President’s News Conference of October 3, 1957, 1957 PUB. 
PAPERS 704, 705–06 (Oct. 3, 1957) [hereinafter President’s October 3 News Conference] 
(“The National Guard, or the State Guard at that moment, was called out and given orders to 
do certain things which were a definite direct defiance of a Federal court’s order. That put the 
issue squarely up to the Executive part of the Government, and I would not, as I told you 
once before in this meeting—such as this—I couldn’t conceive that anyone would so forget 
common sense and our common obligations of loyalty to the Constitution of America that 
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Indeed, he presented his action as necessary to vindicate the rule of law.298 
Eisenhower suggested that public officials sometimes must follow Supreme 
 
force of this kind would ever have to be used for any purpose. But I just say this: the courts 
must be sustained or it’s not America.”); Statement by the President Regarding Continued 
Federal Surveillance at Little Rock, 1957 PUB. PAPERS 701, 701 (Oct. 1, 1957) (stating that 
since Faubus’s statement failed to commit to sufficiently prevent obstruction of federal court 
orders, he had “no recourse at the present time except to maintain Federal surveillance of the 
situation.”); Telegram to Senator Russell of Georgia Regarding the Use of Federal Troops at 
Little Rock, 1957 PUB. PAPERS 695, 696 (Sept. 28, 1957) (“When a State, by seeking to 
frustrate the orders of a Federal Court, encourages mobs of extremists to flout the orders of a 
Federal Court, and when a State refuses to utilize its police powers to protect against mobs 
persons who are peaceably exercising their right under the Constitution as defined in 
such Court orders, the oath of office of the President requires that he take action to give that 
protection. Failure to act in such a case would be tantamount to acquiescence in anarchy and 
the dissolution of the union.”). 
 298. Statement by the President on Compliance with Final Orders of the Courts, 1958 
PUB. PAPERS 631 (Aug. 20, 1958) (“This case, however, or any person’s agreement or 
disagreement with its outcome, must not be confused with the solemn duty that all Americans 
have to comply with the final orders of the court. . . . Defiance of this duty would present the 
most serious problem, but there can be no equivocation as to the responsibility of the federal 
government in such an event. My feelings are exactly as they were a year ago. As I said then: 
‘The very basis of our individual rights and freedoms rests upon the certainty that the 
President and the Executive Branch of Government will support and insure the carrying out 
of the decisions of the Federal Courts.’ Every American must understand that if an 
individual, community or state is going successfully and continuously to defy the courts, then 
there is anarchy.”); The President’s News Conference of March 26, 1958, 1958 PUB. PAPERS 
232 (Mar. 26, 1958) (“Now I have preached, since the day I came to this office, and long 
before, that we are going to solve some of these great internal social problems of the United 
States of America by reason, by education, by tolerance of the other fellow’s views. I do not 
believe that all of these problems can be solved just by a new law, or something that someone 
says, with teeth in it. For example, when we got into the Little Rock thing, it was not my 
province to talk about segregation or desegregation. I had the job of supporting a 
federal court that had issued a proper order under the Constitution, and where compliance 
was prevented by action that was unlawful. I had to do that, and that is an entirely different 
thing from me starting out new laws for attacking this basic problem, which I again say is not 
going to be solved finally until it is done by understanding and reason.”); President’s October 
3 News Conference, supra note 297, at 704 (“I think, having answered your specific 
question, it is well to remember, to re-emphasize to ourselves why the troops are there. The 
problem grew out of the segregation problem, but the troops are not there as a part of the 
segregation problem. They are there to uphold the courts of the land under a law that was 
passed in 1792 because it was early discovered that unless we supported the courts in whose 
hands are all our freedoms and our liberties, our protection against autocratic government, 
then the kind of government set up by our forefathers simply would not work. That is why 
they are there, and for no other purpose, and it is merely incidental that the problem grew out 
of the segregation problem.”); id. at 710 (“But I want to point to this: the great overwhelming 
mass of America believes that our courts and the respect for our courts must be sustained. 
The people that are defying the Courts are doing so under a very mistaken notion of what can 
happen, because if we can with impunity defy successfully the orders of the court in one 
regard, we can in all regards. Consequently, if a case comes up where your right to print the 
news as you see it is challenged by the Government, and the courts find that you are innocent, 
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Court decisions they opposed as had Southern governors with whom he had 
met.299 Although Eisenhower thought that equal rights depended on changes 
in personal feeling and morality which law could not impose,300 he also 
committed to implement Supreme Court decisions. Indeed, Eisenhower 
refused to discuss his own views on school desegregation because he was 
constitutionally obligated to follow the Constitution as interpreted by the 
Supreme Court.301 
Officials in the Eisenhower Justice Department made clear their belief 
that the Court’s decision in Brown was entitled to respect. As the Supreme 
Court prepared to hear oral arguments in Cooper, Attorney General William 
 
and the Government says, ‘We will do nothing that the court says,’ what is going to be the 
result except chaos and anarchy? These courts are not here merely to enforce integration. 
These courts are our bulwarks, our shield against autocratic government. Now, I think, 
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can ever be universally successful. Of course, it will have its effect, and it will be executed as 
laid down by the Supreme Court procedures. But the fact is that we must look to ourselves in 
more of this business.”). 
 301. The President’s News Conference of August 20, 1958, 1958 PUB. PAPERS 621, 626 
(Aug. 20, 1958) (“I have always declined to do that for the simple reason that here was 
something that the Supreme Court says, ‘This is the direction of the Constitution, this is the 
instruction of the Constitution’; that is, they say, ‘This is the meaning of the Constitution.’ 
Now, I am sworn to one thing, to defend the Constitution of the United States, and execute its 
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violently with a decision, and would so express myself, then my own duty would be much 
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P. Rogers addressed the American Bar Association annual meeting in 
California.302 In addition to explaining Brown sympathetically,303 Rogers 
made clear that it represented the law of the land and was obligatory on 
officials. “In our system of government, of course, the Constitution is the 
supreme law of the land and it is the function of the judiciary to expound 
it,”304 he said, echoing, but not citing Marbury, but invoking Alexander 
Hamilton’s Federalist 78. This principle, Rogers said, was “the very 
cornerstone of our federal system.”305 Although Rogers recognized that 
Brown II had left some issues open for resolution, he voiced no patience for 
those whose “intent” was “defiance.”306 “[T]ime to work out constructive 
measures in an honest effort to comply is one thing; time used as a cloak to 
achieve complete defiance of the law of the land is quite another[,]”307 he 
said, explicitly recognizing the Court’s decision in Brown as supreme law. 
Although Rogers pointed out that the United States was not a party in Brown 
and that implementation involved the local courts and the parties, he made 
clear that the federal government could become engaged, as it had in other 
instances, in various ways.308 That would be particularly true if a state 
impeded a judicial decree through misuse of state military forces or failed to 
protect those whose rights a court had determined and violence hindered the 
exercise of those rights.309 These, of course, were the precise conditions that 
had occurred in Little Rock. If a state failed to meet its responsibility by 
impeding a decree or by failing to protect individuals’ rights from 
lawlessness, “there can be no equivocation.”310 As Eisenhower had said, the 
federal government would act to “‘support and insure’” the execution of 
federal court orders.311 In concluding, Rogers reiterated that “[t]he decision 
of the Supreme Court in the school cases and in related fields is the law of 
the land[,]” thereby embracing again the judicial supremacy idea, repeated 
Eisenhower’s view that defiance would lead to anarchy, stated that states 
were obligated to protect the “lawfully determined rights” of individuals 
from violence, and committed the federal government to step in to enforce 
court orders if the states failed.312 
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Although no party expressly supported interposition before the Court, 
the description of events and the parties’ arguments placed that issue 
squarely before the Court. At oral argument on September 11, 1958, 
Solicitor General J. Lee Rankin argued that state officials needed “to carry 
out the obligation of the Constitution of the United States as interpreted by 
this Court,”313 implicitly anticipating the judicial supremacy articulation. He 
further asserted that the Little Rock schools should educate “the people that 
this Supreme Court has spoken, that’s the law of the land; it’s binding; 
we’ve got to do it” and that their duty as citizens was “to obey the law and 
to support the Constitution.”314 
When the Court issued its decision on September 12, 1958, Eisenhower 
emphasized that it was unanimous and appealed “to the sense of civic 
responsibility that animates the vast majority of our citizenry to avoid 
defiance of the Court’s orders in this matter.”315 He invoked common 
knowledge that “if an individual, a community or a state is going 
continuously and successfully to defy the rulings of the Courts, then anarchy 
results.”316 States and localities had a “constitutional duty to maintain peace 
and order.”317 If they faithfully discharged this responsibility, “then lawless 
elements will not be able by force and violence to deprive school children of 
their Constitutional rights.”318 In closing, Eisenhower invoked the rule of 
law: “I hope that all of us may live up to our traditional and proud boast that 
ours is a government of laws. Let us keep it that way.”319 
When Virginia and Arkansas closed public schools later that month 
rather than comply with court orders consistent with Brown, Eisenhower 
said, “[D]irect consequences to the children in those schools and the 
eventual consequences to our Nation could be disastrous” and took the 
occasion implicitly to endorse Brown.320 
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In mid-September, five days after the Court decided Cooper v. Aaron 
but twelve days before it issued its opinion, Rogers spoke in Washington, 
D.C. to a National Conference on Citizenship.321 Rogers observed that 
opponents of Brown argue that a Supreme Court decision was not “an 
authoritative expression of the law,” a position Rogers disparaged as “an 
unsound idea which causes misunderstanding and confusion.”322 The 
Constitution was the supreme law, but it required interpretation which 
occurred “in concrete cases,”323 Rogers said. The Constitution’s framers 
intended that “the ultimate responsibility for interpreting the Constitution 
and for determining whether governmental action squares with 
constitutional requirements should be vested in the federal judiciary.”324 
Once again he relied on Hamilton for the proposition that the Court was to 
“ascertain” constitutional meaning,325 to serve as “the final arbiter in 
constitutional controversies.”326 This idea, “that the judiciary finally must 
determine challenges to the constitutionality of acts of the federal and state 
governments” was “central to our political structure.”327 Individuals who 
disagreed with the Court’s decisions could seek to try to amend the 
Constitution but could not pick and choose which judicial decrees to obey.328 
The Constitution imposed on federal and state officers the obligation to take 
an oath to support the Constitution but that was not an oath to interpret it as 
the individual thought appropriate “but as it is interpreted by our courts.”329 
After the Court handed down its opinion in Cooper, Eisenhower issued 
another statement endorsing Brown and Cooper. Although much of 
Eisenhower’s statement endorsed “equal justice under law” as a central 
American ideal, Eisenhower began by declaring it “incumbent upon all 
Americans, public officials and private citizens alike, to recognize their duty 
of complying with the rulings of the highest court in the land. Any other 
course, as I have said before, would be fraught with grave consequences to 
our nation.”330 
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In October 1958, shortly after the Cooper opinion came out, Rogers 
returned to California to again address the subject. Resistance to Brown was 
damaging America’s standing around the world, he told the California State 
Bar.331 He summarized Cooper positively, highlighting the “fundamental . . . 
proposition that it is the province and the duty of the federal judiciary to 
interpret and expound the law of the Constitution,” a principle that “from the 
earliest days of the Republic . . . has been recognized [as] a permanent and 
indispensable feature of our constitutional system of government.”332 
Contrary to what some state officials had suggested, Cooper made it clear 
that states could not preserve segregation in public schools, Rogers said.333 
People could try to change the law through constitutional amendment, but 
disagreement with the Supreme Court’s decisions did not license its critics 
“to override the Court’s mandate,” he said.334 
Finally, in December 1958, Rogers told the Anti-Defamation League 
that “[t]he legal issue has been settled” such that “defiance” by “extremists 
and fanatics” could not be countenanced and that the Justice Department 
would act vigorously against “guilty parties.”335 The “misconception” that 
Brown “was something less than an authoritative expression of the law” had 
been “effectively dispelled.”336 The decision could not be “nullified.”337  
Yet Eisenhower’s support and the Court’s opinion in Cooper were not 
enough to make Brown a reality in Little Rock. After the Court issued its 
September 12, 1958 order upholding the court of appeals decision, Faubus 
signed legislation calling for a public vote on whether to close Little Rock’s 
public schools, and about two weeks later, just before the Court issued its 
opinion ordering the desegregation plan to go forward, Little Rock voters 
chose to close and privatize the public schools by a lopsided margin.338 The 
day the Court issued its opinion declaring that Faubus must obey its doctrine 
and orders, Faubus defiantly closed the Little Rock schools.339 They 
remained closed for almost a year.340 During this time the various events 
gave rise to litigation, in which the federal court held that the school closing 
was unconstitutional and enjoined further action to frustrate integration, 
moderates won control of the Little Rock School Board, and they 
determined to reopen the schools on an integrated basis.341 Presidential 
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support was certainly helpful to the Court, but it was not sufficient to 
integrate the public schools in Little Rock or elsewhere. Public acceptance 
was even more critical, and Brown and Cooper clearly did not resonate with 
the people of Little Rock in September 1958. 
That would only occur as opponents of desegregation changed their 
minds. After the Court issued its opinion in Cooper, Eisenhower issued a 
statement of support.342 Its first paragraph contained his customary 
invocation of judicial supremacy, but the second paragraph made a more 
substantive argument based on equal justice for all.343 He said: 
The Supreme Court, in its opinion rendered Monday, once again has 
spoken with unanimity on the matter of equality of opportunity for 
education in the nation’s public schools. It is incumbent upon all 
Americans, public officials and private citizens alike, to recognize their 
duty of complying with the rulings of the highest court in the land. Any 
other course, as I have said before, would be fraught with grave 
consequences to our nation. 
Americans have always been proud that their institutions rest on the 
concept of equal justice under law. We must never forget that the rights of 
all of us depend upon respect for the lawfully determined rights of each of 
us. As one nation, we must assure to all our people, whatever their color or 
creed, the enjoyment of their Constitutional rights and the full measure of 
the law’s protection. We must be faithful to our Constitutional ideals and go 
forward in good faith with the unremitting task of translating them into 
reality.344 
Later that month, Eisenhower answered a question about civil rights to 
a Republican group, saying that existing laws and decisions would “be 
brought into effect only as the whole population, in its heart and in its 
intelligence, understands that this principle of equality is important to the 
United States and must be sustained.”345 These ideals would not “be 
achieved in a moment, or even in a year[,]” but “the Republican Party will 
always work for this ideal.”346 
Eisenhower’s expressions recognized that public acceptance was a 
necessary component of legal efficacy. That had been a long-standing belief 
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which he had previously articulated on other occasions.347 Then he had 
coupled his defense of judicial supremacy with calls for recognition that 
change in racial attitudes would occur gradually.348 Although he still said 
that change would not occur “in a moment, or even a year[,]” he now 
increasingly introduced some calls for racial justice.349 
Eisenhower initially may have thought that emphasizing judicial 
supremacy would be more persuasive with a Little Rock audience than 
defending Brown or perhaps the former formulation was more comfortable 
for him. Eisenhower often thought in terms of duty; as Brownell later put it, 
“for Eisenhower, his duty, first and foremost, was to see that the 
Constitution, and by implication the Supreme Court’s interpretation of it, 
was upheld.”350 Perhaps Eisenhower exploited judicial supremacy since it 
provided an alternative vocabulary which allowed him to avoid taking an 
overt stand on Brown even while supporting its enforcement.351 Ultimately, 
the argument also had to appeal to hearts, minds, and self-interest, and the 
political branches needed to join the judiciary in public education and 
action. The Court’s judgments are stated to be “universally prescriptive” 
wrote Alexander Bickel, but they “actually become so only when they gain 
widespread assent.”352 To bind non-parties they require “the assent and the 
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cooperation, first of the political institutions, and ultimately of the 
people.”353 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In Cooper, the Supreme Court responded to the defiance of Faubus and 
other Southern politicians by insisting that it was the ultimate constitutional 
interpreter and that its constitutional decisions bound state officials. The 
Southerners’ challenge attracted the Court’s attention and, in responding, the 
Court understandably reached back to an old chestnut like Marbury to try to 
place the promise of Brown on the firmest legal foundation. For reasons 
stated above, Marbury did not really provide the support to anchor the 
sweeping claims the Court made regarding judicial supremacy. 
Nonetheless, the Court’s claims of judicial supremacy deserve a greater 
presumption of validity in a federalism context than in separation of powers 
disputes. The constitutional imperatives that federal law is supreme and 
should be interpreted uniformly require a national arbiter, and the Court is 
often the institution which draws that assignment even if the constitutional 
system must allow some leeway to criticize, test, and revise Supreme Court 
doctrine even in a federalism context.354 The Court was encouraged to assert 
its supremacy in constitutional interpretation by the recurring statements 
Eisenhower and high officials in the Department of Justice made supporting 
the idea that the Court’s conclusions in that regard bound other officials. In 
this sense, Cooper provides something of a complementary bookend (or 
case-end) to Marbury where the Court declined to issue the order consistent 
with its resolution of the merits for lack of presidential support. In Cooper, 
by contrast, Eisenhower’s support of judicial supremacy emboldened the 
Court. 
Yet even that was insufficient. Cooper illustrated the difficulty the 
Court faces in umpiring a federalism dispute even with presidential support 
that involves one of those relatively rare episodes that engage intense 
emotional reactions. The effective functioning of the national government 
often depends on the concerted action of multiple branches, especially when 
the Court is called to resolve matters which are socially contentious. Even 
so, Cooper teaches that in such situations, judicial pronouncements, even 
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when forcefully asserted in unanimous decisions, may only work gradual 
change. Ultimately, sustainable constitutional change depends not simply on 
workable constitutional doctrine supported by political officials, but also 
public acceptance. 
